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Central Eurasia Military Affairs

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ARMED FORCES ISSUES

Training, Capabilities of GRU Spetsnaz Unit Detailed

954F0300A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 9 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Correspondent Vladimir Zainetdinov, under the rubric: "TOP SECRET" [as published in original Russian source]: "Piranha From the 'Aquarium' or a Saga About the Noble Saboteurs From Russian Military Intelligence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, October 3-5, 1993. Troops move into the capital to suppress the revolt of the supporters of the former Supreme Soviet. Motorized rifle troops, "veveshniki" [Air Force personnel?], paratroopers, tank crew men and spetsnaz [special forces] personnel of various units... At that time few people knew that a GRU special forces brigade, that was especially not making a show of its presence, was garrisoned in the city of Chuchkovo in Ryazan Oblast and was part of the "belokamennaya" [white rock]...

Comrade Zhukov Issued a Strict Order...

GRU GSh—the General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (according to Viktor Suvorov—the "Aquarium") is perhaps the only intelligence service which has "in its inventory" not only traditional special subunits but also special forces troops—GRU spetsnaz. It's not surprising that until recently rumors about it practically did not reach the broad masses. The "Aquarium" knows how to keep its secrets.

The history of the GRU special forces troops began in the 1950's. The Cold War was gaining strength. The world, split into "reds" and "whites", was preparing for a third world war. Then USSR Minister of Defense Marshal Georgiy Zhukov submitted a proposal to the Politburo: create special sabotage and reconnaissance detachments in the border military districts which would cause a "ruckus" in enemy front rear areas in the event of a wartime or pre-war crisis.

It began with separate special forces companies and, already by the end of 1959, there were more than 40 companies with 113 men in each. In 1960, the companies began to be combined into battalions and later—into SpN brigades (SpN—is the officially approved spetsnaz abbreviation). The first GRU spetsnaz brigade appeared in 1963—that same "Chuchkovo" brigade which quietly occupied positions in Moscow in 1993. By the beginning of the 1970's, 13 spetsnaz brigades and two dozen independent companies had been created. The Navy also created similar naval sabotage subunits. The strength of all SpN units reached nearly 80,000 men. At first, their cover story was that they were motorized riflemen, pilots or communications personnel. After some time had passed, they all donned airborne uniforms, except for the ones assigned "abroad". In the GRU, the 5th Operational Intelligence Directorate directs all spetsnaz troops.

The War of Wars, but the Main Thing—Maneuvers

Former SpN Units Senior Officer Nikolay Kh. told us the following.

"They trained us only for war. In the event of "turmoil" or just prior to it, special teams (actually—these are the backbones of partisan detachments) would be formed from reservists who had undergone the appropriate training and who would "settle" into the surrounding territory. GRU brigades "operate" while relying on these detachments and illegal GRU secret agents. Spetsnaz are surreptitiously dropped into enemy rear areas and destroy previously nominated important military targets: missile launchers, headquarters and command posts, large army formations, munitions depots, weapons, airfields, and naval bases. For example, in Europe the SpN brigade that was stationed in Germany at "H-Hour" should have destroyed American Pershing launch pads. The GRU spetsnaz "area of responsibility" also extends to strategic civilian targets: electric power plants, dams, military plants and industrial enterprises. Furthermore, we conduct reconnaissance of hostile troops from illegal positions and conduct active measures in enemy rear areas: sabotage, capturing personnel to be interrogated and transporting them across the front lines, and terrorist acts against enemy command personnel and the civilian authorities.

What can GRU spetsnaz do? For example, a small sabotage and reconnaissance party (approximately 15-20 men) is capable of "standing on its ear" the rear area of an entire army but a brigade—will generally be able to keep the entire front tense. They teach sabotage-explosive work to modern spetsnaz-intelligence personnel (a trained soldier can independently derail a rail consist, blow up a missile silo, or mine a fuel depot in a matter of minutes, knows how to make explosives even from readily available components), parachute jumps, hand-to-hand combat, take out sentries (they won't have time to squeal), recruit agents and work with them (officers must have good language training), or survive under extreme conditions. For example, previously there was such training when they would drop one spetsnaz soldier in an unfamiliar location with three rounds of ammunition and one-day's field rations. He had to hold out for 10 days and, not simply survive during that time, but also do his work.

GRU spetsnaz also has its specific arms and equipment. Besides the traditional "Kalashnikov" and PM [Makarov Pistol], there are assault weapons with silencers and sniper carbines that have been developed for a special 9-mm cartridge (it penetrates practically any flak jacket), a pistol with a silencer, "Shmed" pressure-effect munitions, directional and remote-controlled mines, and the "Plamya" automatic grenade thrower. The special pride—is the scout's knife with the always driving blade that both cuts, scrapes, quietly bites through thick wire and also fires from the handle.

The radio operator carries a radio that was developed only for GRU units. Its operating radius is up to 3,000

kilometers and it weighs 12 kilograms. A radiogram "is fired" into the center at nearly instantaneous speed and therefore it is very difficult to "DF" the special transmitter.

Exercises, field exercises, and live firing exercises during the day and at night under any weather conditions—is the everyday life of GRU spetsnaz. A spetsnaz soldier always "fights" for real, based upon actual missions. For example, during the traditional Warsaw Pact troops "Shchit" exercises, GRU spetsnaz brigades that were deployed near the western borders had to actually cross the state border of the two countries. That's the real mission. Everyone was on their toes: the border troops, the militia, internal troops, and state security. They tracked them with dogs, searched for them from helicopters, and conducted thorough searches and round-ups.

Afghanistan: They Went In First and Came Out—Last

A General Staff April 26, 1979 SECRET DIRECTIVE ordered: form a detachment to accomplish special missions in Afghanistan based on the Turkestan Military District GRU independent spetsnaz brigade that is quartered at Chirchik. The formation was completed on August 1, 1979. Here they tested the method of manning detachments with reservists. Nearly all of the soldiers and officers were recruited from Uzbeks and Tajiks and all of them spoke Dari [Afghan Persian], Pashtu, or Farsi. The celebrated "Moslem battalion" that participated in storming the Dictator Amin's palace along with saboteurs from the KGB was nothing other than GRU spetsnaz personnel. They introduced the detachment into Kabul at the beginning of August 1979.

In December of that same year, 1979, Chief of the General Staff Marshal Ogarkov and GRU Chief Inashutki decided to airlift the 1st SpN Detachment with a strength of 539 men to the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]. On January 7, 1980, Inashutki reported to Ogarkov that "it is advisable to form one more special detachment of 677 men based on the Transcaucasian and Central Asian military districts to accomplish special missions in crisis situations on the territory of Afghanistan".

In March 1985, the situation in Afghanistan became complicated. Add to this the disorder that had begun even in GRU units: drunkenness, drug addiction, and fighting. There also was no precise command and control and coordination system with other troops. Marshal Akhromeyev, who became chief of the General Staff after Ogarkov, made the decision to introduce into the DRA command and control units and another two GRU spetsnaz brigades of 3,000 men each. They were formed based on Central Asian and Turkestan Military District brigades. On March 29, 1985, the headquarters of the "Central Asian" brigade stood up at Lashkar Gah (Helmand Province) and the "Turkestan" brigade stood up at Jalalabad. The units had a motorized rifle brigade cover story.

The brigade deployed at Lashkar Gah began combat operations already in April 1985. Attached to it were 82 Mi-24 combat helicopters and 32 Mi-8 transport helicopters. They defined for it an area of responsibility with a 1,100 kilometer front and 250 kilometer depth toward Pakistan.

"We were the first to set out on the path of weapons caravans that travel from Pakistan and Iran," says a former spetsnaz officer who chased "Dukhi" for a couple of years in Afghanistan. "All GRU secret agents on neighboring territory worked on us. However, the Dushmani also did not doze. Having mastered our tactics, they changed theirs. For example, we are just setting up a battery and we are preparing to depart when the "Dukhi" already know about it from local residents via light telegraph [svetovoy telegraf]. But we were also no slouches. The team got into 'armor' and we moved out. We quietly jump off at the required spot, set up an ambush on the path, and the vehicle moved on ahead... They were afraid of us and bitterly hated us, especially the drug traffickers."

"In July 1986, a team from the Lashkar Gah brigade managed to seize 14 tonnes of raw opium which the Mujaheddin were transporting from Pakistan in eight vehicles. The leaders of the 'Dukhi' sentenced Brigade Commander Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimov to death for that. It was nothing, he survived. But a combat sortie against a caravan turned out badly for one of this SpN unit's teams on October 31, 1987.

"At first the operation succeeded. Having killed the guards, they seized a large arms caravan. They reported to "base" and received an order to guard it until reinforcements arrived. But, during the night, the 'Dukhi' crept up unnoticed and placed the intelligence personnel in a ring. Surprise close-range concentrated fire from large-caliber Chinese DShK's [Degtyarev and Shpagin heavy machineguns] was reliable, sudden and short-lived. Fourteen soldiers headed by the commander died immediately. Only eight soldiers survived. When the team was airlifted out using helicopters, a horrible sight appeared before their eyes. They had maliciously violated the dead spetsnaz personnel. The corpses had been disfigured: the heads had been cut off and perforated, their stomachs had been ripped out, and some had been burned with napalm. Later, we had difficulty identifying many of them... The Lashkar Gah battalion lost a total of 191 personnel in Afghanistan and it destroyed approximately 5,000 Dushmani. It confiscated enough weapons for an entire division.

"We were the very last to leave Afghanistan...."

Instead of an Afterward

Unfortunately, today GRU spetsnaz is already not the same. After the collapse of the USSR and the division of the Soviet Army, the most combat capable brigades remained outside Russia's borders. They were immediately expropriated. Three brigades passed into the possession of Ukraine: at Kirovograd, Izyaslav (Transcarpathia) and Saryy Krym (the Crimea). It is about this

spetsnaz that we talked about during the Crimean Crisis of the summer of 1994. The sharpest and best equipped brigade in the GRU—the brigade at Marina Gorka that came in first place among all SpN units for five years in a row—passed into the possession of Belorussia. Brigades from Georgia (the city of Lagodekhi), Vilyandi (Estonia), from Germany, and also the 75th Independent Company from Hungary (the city of Nyiregyhaza) and from other border groups of forces have been withdrawn and disbanded.

P.S. A professional holiday recently occurred in the GRU—the 75th anniversary of military intelligence. We congratulate everyone.

GROUND TROOPS

Air Search and Rescue Chief Interviewed

954E0102A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Oct 94 p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General of Aviation Gennadiy Amelkin, chief of the Federal Aerospace Search and Rescue Administration under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Aleksandr Andryushkov; place and date not given: "Disaster Knows No Nationality, and We Should Also Look After the Rescuers Together"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Inroads by glaciers... Flooding everywhere... The impact of gigantic meteorites, volcanic eruptions, and earthquakes. Wars, accidents, and disasters... Only the unique capability of man to adapt to all the natural and social cataclysms has saved the human race. But when he finds himself in trouble he has always directed his plea for help to the heavens and his brothers. Disasters occur suddenly even today. Lt Gen Avn Gennadiy Amelkin, chief of the Federal Aerospace Search and Rescue Administration under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, tells a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent about those who come to our assistance in an emergency and their problems.*

From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's files: G.V. Amelkin was born in the town of Arkadak, Saratov Oblast, on 20 June 1941. He graduated from the Balashovskoye Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots and the VVA [Military Aviation Academy] imeni Yu.A. Gagarin. He served in different command positions in military transport aviation. He was deputy chief of staff for long-range aviation for two years. From 1988 to 1991 he was the general officer commanding an operational task force in the Arctic. In 1991 he headed the Aviation Search and Rescue Service. He has served in this capacity since 1992.

[Andryushkov] Gennadiy Vasilyevich, A special aviation search and rescue service to help disaster victims was established in our country in the early 1970's. Nearly a quarter of a century has gone by since then. What does Russia have today?

[Amelkin] Since we began this discussion from a historical standpoint, let us talk about the destiny of our service from its origins. I am deeply convinced that there is no more humanitarian task for any state than rescuing the victims of a disaster. You will recall how we rushed to help the Chelyuskin aviators in the 1930's, and that it was considered the highest honor in battle during the war years to save a friend. But the first aviation detachments of professional military lifesavers were formed in the USSR only in 1971 in the Moscow and Leningrad military districts, and after six years a unified state search and rescue service to aid disaster victims was established. The flexible and highly mobile system covered the entire territory of the former Union. It combined the forces and resources of all departments with aircraft. Its specialists—pilots, parachutists, physicians, engineers—were prepared to render assistance to victims of disaster on land and sea.

All of the country's territory was divided into regions and zones of responsibility conforming to the boundaries of military districts. About 350 airplanes and helicopters were on call around the clock. A duty crew was given 10 minutes for takeoff after a disaster alarm. Additional forces joined the operation in an hour and a half. Both professionals and supernumerary rescue detachments were enlisted in the search and rescue efforts.

The unified PSS [search and rescue service] system, like the country, collapsed in 1991. But life demanded that the service be revived. Aviation and maritime accidents can be expected, catastrophes involving technology have become more frequent, and natural cataclysms involve terrible disasters. The SOS alarm continues to be heard over Russia and the CIS countries. The Federal Aerospace Search and Rescue Service was established by an edict of the Russian president on 16 September 1992. Only it must be stated frankly that there is no better guarantee that victims of a disaster will be saved.

[Andryushkov] Obviously, the problems in overall reform of the Armed Forces have affected the newly formed service as well.

[Amelkin] Yes, the question of our departmental subordination has become critical. One of the alternatives provided for the transfer of military rescuers to the Ministry of Emergency Situations. Would this be of more value? I doubt it. This would mean fragmentation of the service's forces and resources. Military rescue personnel would "inflate" the staffing structure of the MChS [Ministry of Emergency Situations], but the aircraft would remain under the Ministry of Defense. Operational efficiency in the conduct of search and rescue operations would decline.

We may say today that common sense has prevailed. Nearly two years of reorganizing the unified State Aviation Search and Rescue Service has reached the finish line. This April the president of the Russian Federation signed the edict establishing the Federal Aerospace Search and Rescue Administration under the Russian

Federation Ministry of Defense. The government adopted the Statute on our administration by a special decree on 19 June 1994.

[Andryushkov] What have they stipulated that is new and what powers did the service acquire after reorganization?

[Amelkin] The principal assignment of the administration is to organize the search for and rescue of passengers and crews of aircraft involved in accidents and the search for and evacuation of cosmonauts and spacecraft from the points where they came down on land or water, as well as to render assistance with aircraft to persons involved in technical accidents, catastrophes, and natural disasters throughout the territory of the Russian Federation.

Inasmuch as the Federal Aerospace Search and Rescue Administration (FPSU) operates as a state institution under the Ministry of Defense, the minister of defense has issued an order granting me the right, as its chief, to give instructions to the persons in authority in branches of the Armed Forces, military districts, fleets, and components in matters dealing with the direct organization of aerospace search and rescue and to monitor the execution of these instructions. In a word, the FPSU performs the role of a search and rescue service for aviation of the Armed Forces in the Ministry of Defense structure.

The solution of other matters related to the formation of the aerospace search and rescue system now depends on the Federal Assembly. The State Duma should adopt the "Air Code of the Russian Federation," which will define the bases of aviation search and rescue in the state, in the form of a law. In addition, the government should confirm the Federal Aviation Regulations and the supplement to the code "Search for and Rescue of Aircraft Passengers and Crews." The drafts of these documents have been worked out.

[Andryushkov] Documents do not play the decisive role in rendering aid to disaster victims, however. This is done by specific individuals, the military lifesavers. The number of personnel is stipulated by the statute on the FPSU. But if we take the size of Russia's territory into account, one person is responsible for a region the size of Poland...

[Amelkin] You have touched upon one of our most critical problems. You know, the military aviation rescue personnel were not idle during the entire period that the service was being reorganized. We provided support for flights by all the ministries and departments and rescued people in emergency situations. The rescue personnel have a huge workload. Compare this: In the United States, 9.3 million square kilometers are covered by 310 aircraft, but over 17 million square kilometers in Russia are served by 260 aircraft (less than 20 percent of which are in regular service). These forces are extremely inadequate. The fleet of aircraft is hardly being updated

at all. Nevertheless, military rescue personnel helped 160 persons, 108 of whom were cockpit personnel, escape disaster in 1993. Some 269 victims of natural disasters were evacuated. It is no easier this year: 63 persons (34 cockpit personnel) were rescued in aviation accidents, and we evacuated 682 persons in natural disasters. And this is without taking into account the tragedy in the Kuril Islands. Rescue operations are still under way there.

I point out two of the most complicated problems in organizing aviation search and rescue at present, the roots of which lie in the country's uncontrollable transition to the market. After the Ministry of Civil Aviation was abolished, the newly formed aviation concerns and joint-stock companies were more concerned about any means of achieving maximum profits than in providing for aviation safety. I am certain that they cannot guarantee passengers that their flights will have a favorable outcome. Especially the rendering of assistance in an emergency. The newly fledged "aviation firm owners" are reluctant to interact with the military rescuers. They turn to us when the fat's in the fire, as they say.

It is hard for our people. Professionals are leaving the small air search and rescue units because of financial considerations. There are cases when it is hard to man the duty crews. This leads to a decline in the dependability of search and rescue support. Generally speaking, there is one price for miscalculations in forming a system to help disaster victims—human life.

[Andryushkov] I think it is appropriate to add here that tragedy is essentially international in nature. It knows no boundaries. If there is interaction between rescue personnel in the CIS today, are they prepared to render assistance to each other?

[Amelkin] As far as I know, the former republics in the USSR have their own rescue services. I will not make a judgment on the level of their professionals' training, since there is no collaboration. Although certain conclusions may be drawn from experience. For example, take the recent tragedy in the Baltic Sea with the ferry Estonia. The Scandinavians rescued those who were drowning there. The Estonians refused help from the Russians. This purely political gesture will weigh heavily on their conscience, I am certain. Our forces and resources were prepared to provide assistance to the people. There is no center for overall coordination in rendering disaster assistance in the CIS today. It is critically needed—after all, disaster knows no nationality. It may turn out that many former republics will prove to be zones of increased danger which people throughout the world will avoid.

[Andryushkov] Gennadiy Vasilyevich, is it really necessary to demonstrate in the various state structures that the military rescue personnel know how to work well, that their authority is appraised highly everywhere, and that this very specific service is essential to Russia itself?

How long will lifesaving be based on the residual principle, so to speak, stemming from the "economic difficulties." I have here a letter from a lifesaver in the Far East. It contains a cry from the heart: Supply us with the equipment and resources we need—otherwise, we will not be the ones rescuing others, we will have to be rescued ourselves...

[Amelkin] The Federal Aerospace Search and Rescue Administration is standing on its own feet in its new role under the difficult conditions in most other structures. It is naturally experiencing similar problems. We do not have enough funds for new and improved emergency rescue equipment and materials, the fleet of helicopters and airplanes is becoming obsolete and is not being replenished, and there are many other minor but exhausting problems. We are being saved at present by the fact that the rescue personnel are persons who are deeply devoted to their work and prepared to surmount numerous difficulties officially and in everyday life. But can people be patient for a long time?

NAVAL FORCES

R-Adm Aleksin Argues for Effectiveness of Naval Weaponry

95UM0053C Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 9, Sep 94 pp 16-17

[Article by Rear-Admiral V. Aleksin, chief navigator of the Navy, under rubric: "Isn't Everything That Bad?": "The Honor of the Uniform, or the Question of the Real Might of the Russian Navy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For a long while now Army and Navy affairs have not given certain mass media a minute's peace, and lately they have become especially active in criticizing the effectiveness of our weapons. With respect to the Navy, they assert that it has not taken part in combat operations for many decades now and its real might allegedly can be assessed only on the basis of conclusions of so-called independent experts, and by no means on the basis of conclusions of the command element and appropriate specialists of the Navy, who solely wish to defend the "honor of the uniform." And the Navy's "catastrophic state" in connection with its high accident rate also is emphasized.

Without referring to the identities of several (as a rule one and the same) former officers who play the part of these same "independent experts," let us dwell on the essence of "accusations" they advance.

First of all, with respect to "non-involvement of our Navy ships in combat operations for many decades." Yes, in fact, in recent years the Navy has not been active in such "measures" (if we do not count missions of evacuating refugees, equipment and weapons and peace-making functions during the recent conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia that is familiar to all). But can the Navy be accused of this? Hardly, I believe. Moreover,

thank God, as they say, that the Navy has not had to test the real effectiveness of its weapons for so many years now. At the same time, it cannot help but be noted that our ships (and not even the newest design projects) purchased from the former USSR by other countries repeatedly have taken part in various regional military conflicts and wars as part of their navies in the last quarter century. As a rule they conceded nothing to the armament of western countries, i.e., ships and weapons made by NATO, including by the United States (we will note that this is regardless of the proficiency of crews).

Thus, in 1967 Elat, one of the newest Israeli Navy destroyers, received from England, was destroyed by a missile salvo of two Soviet-built craft which were part of the Egyptian Navy. During the war between India and Pakistan in December 1971 the Indian Navy, consisting of former Soviet ships and missile craft, destroyed the main forces of the enemy fleet essentially in the course of one naval battle. (The latter included British-made and American-made ships: Battle-class destroyers, Gorchakov-class submarines and so on.) The Indian craft used the remaining cruise missiles to deliver a strike against Karachi, a port and main naval base of Pakistan. The population and leadership of Pakistan almost went into a state of shock from the enormous fire of oil storage tanks against which the missiles were targeted and from its aftermath.

In 1988 the Iraqi Navy hit the U.S. O. Perry-Class guided missile frigate Stark, one of the newest ships comprising the basis of U.S. Navy mobile ASW forces, with a cruise missile from a Soviet-made fighter-bomber.

With respect to raising objections to "consultants" who assert that Russian naval weapons allegedly are "ineffective," it is also possible to cite examples of another nature and with reference to the opinion of the western experts now so deeply loved in Russia.

In recent years our ships repeatedly have paid official and unofficial calls, as well as business calls, at ports and naval bases of the United States, Great Britain, Canada, FRG, France and other countries. They also have taken part in joint maneuvers and exercises with their ships and have been part of multinational forces, so specialists there could assess the state of our Navy not only from the external appearance of ships and their crews, but also from actual naval proficiency and results of their practical actions, including with the employment of weapons. Well then, all of them declared as one that our navymen not only appear better than many others, but also moor and fire more skillfully than anyone. Is this not a persuasive indicator of the state of our Navy?

Now about the circulation of statements by certain skeptics concerning the situation with our "target" submarines that is "murderous," "catastrophic" and so on. They "decorated" Russian submarines with the "target" epithet for their noisiness, which allegedly exceeds the similar characteristic of U.S. SSN's by an order of

magnitude as a minimum, and for their range of detection, which is "hundreds of times" less compared with the very same U.S. submarines. And in order that the author not be accused of prooflessness, it makes sense to turn to an analysis of the real state of things, and not to advertising brochures and declarations (from both sides, by the way).

It is generally recognized (not only here, but also abroad) that the accident rate of ships under peacetime conditions is the integral final result of such components as level of crew combat training and the quality and reliability of surface ships and submarines and their weapons and equipment. The sum of these components is approximately identical for submarines of the Russian and U.S. navies, as confirmed by an analysis of almost 20 collisions of submarines of both sides which occurred in a submerged condition in the period 1967-1993. (By the way, the Americans also agree with this conclusion.) Many are familiar with the last two such collisions in the Barents Sea in 1992 and 1993, but not everyone knows that after the collision in 1992, the U.S. SSN *Baton Rouge* is not due to be repaired and has been decommissioned, and SSN *Grayling*, a participant of the second incident in 1993, still is under repair. But after the collisions, both of our submarines underwent restorative repairs, their crews rehearsed the full course of combat training missions, and now the SSN's already have been in operational readiness. These facts should say a great deal even to a nonspecialist and nonprofessional (not to mention to those who categorize themselves as "experts" on the Navy), at the very least that the combat qualities of our submarines are approximately of the same order of magnitude as U.S. submarines.

It would appear that another fact also is useful for comprehending this problem. This year a number of highly placed U.S. Navy representatives have come out with a proposal to give up further operation of their SOSUS fixed underwater situation coverage system, which for many years was the basis for tracking our submarines and for warfare against them. True, the official version of the reason for this (reduction in budget appropriations) does not coincide with the real reason, in my view. The whole point is that SOSUS has become ineffective against our new, quiet submarines, since it was designed for Soviet submarines built during 1960-1970 which—and this has to be admitted—really were dozens of times noisier than those which have been built over the last decade.

The quality of our submarines also is indicated eloquently by the fact that they are being purchased abroad, particularly the *Varshavyanka* Class (Kilo Class according to the "Jane's" classification) by Iran, and not similar design projects being produced, for example, by Germany or Sweden. This was caused not only by the fact that our submarines are almost twice as cheap, but chiefly because of their higher combat effectiveness. The latter also is indicated by the alarm which the appearance in the Persian Gulf of an Iranian submarine of our

construction caused for the Americans. They can be understood: because of low noise, it is very difficult to detect these submarines even by the most modern U. S. Los Angeles-Class SSN's being employed in the combat screen of aircraft carriers.

Now about the Russian Navy's "catastrophic" accident rate. If we assess it according to the relative accident rate indicator, also generally recognized in the world and figured as the ratio of the number of navy ships having accidents in one year to the navy's actual strength, then over the last seven years this indicator was 2.35 times less in the Russian Navy than in the U.S. Navy.

The question concerning the ratio of submarine disasters also can be answered with the help of figures. During the postwar period four submarines out of 150 in the Navy order of battle were lost in the U.S. Navy (of which two were nuclear powered: *Thresher* in 1963 and *Scorpion* in 1968). Seven submarines were lost in the USSR Navy during that same period, of which there were three SSN's: K-8 in 1970, K-219 in 1986 and *Komsomolets* in 1989. But when we take into account that the USSR had a little more than twice as many submarines as the United States, then the relative accident rate is 2.7 for the Americans and 2.3 for us, i.e., approximately the same.

These data are cited not at all to surprise the world and to say that we have solved all problems. For example, with the perceptible and stable reduction in the level of accidents and incidents in the Navy in recent years, least progress was achieved in preventing equipment accidents of ships. But the protracted economic crisis in the country played a role of no small importance here along with questions of a purely naval nature, crew proficiency, execution and so on. Other numerous problems facing the Navy today also are linked with this same global reason, and not at all with a "lack of understanding" of the situation at hand by the Navy command, let alone by its desire "to defend the uniform": decommissioning of ships which have not yet served their time, a reduction in the naval aviation fleet, shortage of POL, almost total absence of weapon and equipment deliveries and so on. By the way, this has been spoken and written about repeatedly, including in *MORSKOY SBORNIK*. And the piquancy of the position of the Navy's opponents specifically is that in rebuking the Navy command for an inability "to change the situation for the better in a cardinal manner" and for the fact that their "specific" suggestions "to improve," "to strengthen," "to increase" and so on are not being accepted, they did not breathe a word of HOW to do this, especially with the present breakdown of the Russian economy.

"Dreams" of a thorough inspection of the present state of the Navy in the hope that after this the naval educational institutions and scientific research institutes will develop a program for "recreating a combat-effective Navy" are just as unrealistic. While it is still possible to

agree with this in some way from the aspect of technical reequipping, it is impossible, let's say, in the area of naval art. The fact is that even its key component, tactics, by no means originates in scientific research institutes or in naval educational institutions. It is created above all in the Navy by those people who serve aboard new ships under new conditions and have good knowledge of and improve the ships' capabilities, bringing them into line with requirements of modern war and the present situation (not to mention strategic and operational questions of organizational development and reform of the Navy, which cannot be resolved only by efforts of scientific research institutes and naval educational institutions).

Yes, the basis of Navy might is made up specifically of people who serve in the Navy today, the majority of whom serve conscientiously despite the fact that their military labor—I will not fear high style—unfortunately is by no means assessed adequately. So would it not have been better for the respected retired officers, who not only gave their best years to the Navy, but also received much from it in exchange, not to accuse the Navy of all conceivable and inconceivable sins, but to come to the defense of their present successors? Believe me, it is the latter who will come to understand HOW to increase its effectiveness, HOW to reduce noise and the accident rate and, most important, HOW to preserve the honor of the uniform not in words, but in action by defending the homeland's interests. All of the almost 300 years of Russian Navy history are confirmation of this.

Debating Mission: Navy vs Navy

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[Article by Retired Rear Admiral Radiy Anatolyevich Zubkov, scientific secretary of the Scientific Research Center of the Committee of Scientists for Global Security and a member of the presidium of the "Peace to the Oceans" International Committee, and Retired Lieutenant-General Mikhail Sergeyevich Vinogradov, director of the Scientific Research Center of the Committee of Scientists for Global Security and deputy committee chairman: "Navy Against Navy and Not Navy Against the Shore: Why Russia Needs a Navy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Radiy Anatolyevich Zubkov is a retired rear admiral. He is a Great Patriotic War participant. He was the Navy's chief navigator from 1974-1986. At the present time, he is scientific secretary of the Scientific Research Center of the Committee of Scientists for Global Security. He is a member of the presidium of the "Peace to the Oceans" International Committee.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Vinogradov is a retired lieutenant-general. He is a Great Patriotic War participant. He served in the PVO [Air Defense] Troops. He was Naval PVO District deputy chief of staff from 1968-1973. At the present time, he is the director of the Scientific Research

Center of the Committee of Scientists for Global Security and deputy chairman of the committee.

Reflections

"... I have always been convinced: before deciding what kind of navy to build, you must precisely establish its place in the system of the Armed Forces and its mission in the event of war".

Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov

During the course of the last 5-6 years, the question on the present and future Russian Navy and why and what kind of Navy Russia needs is regularly raised in the press. While joining in the discussion of this issue, we however intend to avoid traditional references to the obvious need for Russia to be a "two-handed potentate", to the enormous length of its maritime borders and the correlation with the length of the land borders, to Russia's greatness as a naval power and so forth. But at the same time, we think it is necessary to caution those people who for various reasons cannot get beyond purely continental (or purely pacifist) thinking, about the danger of underestimation, and also neglect of the naval factor in Russian Federation (RF) military policy, and the failure to understand the need for a proper naval policy. There are a multitude of examples of that in the history of Russia and other states.

While answering the question posed in the article's title, we can very briefly define the role of the Russian Navy in the following manner: the Navy serves to parry dangers and threats to the country's vitally important interests, prevents or minimizes damage to them by demonstrating the readiness to employ force or its actual employment in the sea and ocean zones within the framework of the unified system of Armed Forces operations in peacetime and in wartime.

We consider the following to be vitally important interests, the defense of which may require the employment of military force, including the Navy: the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian Federation and of the states allied with it; the rights of freedom and property of RF citizens and the material and spiritual values of its society; and, peace and stability throughout the Earth, especially near the borders of the Russian Federation and of the states allied with it.

As historical experience, current events in the world and predictions of the development of the international situation indicate, a danger or threat to Russian Federation vitally important interests can be created and damage to them can be inflicted from the sea and ocean zones or in these zones (we will also utilize the equivalent concept of "adjacent seas and other areas of the World Ocean"), including the island and coastal territories of Russia and of foreign states that are part of them, most likely through the following activities:

- a) in peacetime: through attempts of the unsanctioned penetration of foreign navies, saboteurs, and smugglers, including drug traffickers, into RF territorial

and internal waters and onto its territory; unleashing border conflicts by carrying out armed provocations on sectors of the state border that pass through adjacent seas; through attempts of unsanctioned extraction of natural resources from the waters and from the bottom of the seas and oceans in territorial and internal waters, in an exclusive economic zone, on the continental shelf and others, and in areas of the World Ocean that are under RF jurisdiction by subjects of foreign states; through actions of foreign states that are directed at restricting freedom of navigation of RF military and civilian ships on the high seas or access to the resources of its waters and bottom in areas that are not under the jurisdiction of other states or international organizations; through terrorist or pirate acts against RF military and civilian ships and other maritime objects that have been committed by non-state armed formations; through a qualitative and quantitative build-up of the combat potentials of the navies of the primary naval powers, through the violation of international treaties, agreements and unilateral obligations in the sphere of the limitation and reduction of naval arms, naval activities and the accomplishment of other confidence-building measures by them; through the conduct of reconnaissance by foreign naval intelligence agents using methods that violate safety of navigation of military and civilian ships, and flights of aircraft and that impede the conduct of combat training of naval forces on the high seas and in the airspace over them; through the build-up of the forces of foreign navies in the sea and ocean zones adjacent to RF territory to levels that violate the existing correlation of forces; through operations of foreign navies that impede the functioning of naval strategic nuclear forces, the support systems of all of the country's strategic nuclear forces, state and military command and control, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, or navigation; through the possibility of the surprise employment of both precision-guided conventional and nuclear weapons by foreign navies against RF economic, administrative-political and military targets, ground troops (naval forces) and the population; through attacks against RF military and civilian ships and other maritime targets by the armed forces of states-participants of regional or local military conflicts in which Russia is not participating; through attacks against RF Armed Forces facilities that are located in foreign states; and, through encroachments on the rights and freedoms, lives and property of RF citizens and state organizations in foreign maritime states; through the actions enumerated above and also through other aggressive or illegal actions that have been carried out with regard to various states-members of the international community, first of all those allied with the Russian Federation and that inflict damage to peace and stability on Earth;

- b) in wartime (the cited list of actions is not tied to the Navy of any definite state but is based upon an analysis of existing capabilities, of tested and developed models of naval arms and equipment and of rehearsed or studied methods of their employment): through destruction of important economic, administrative-political and military targets, general purpose ground troops (naval forces) and the population using the conventional weapons of foreign navies (and air forces operating in the sea and ocean zones); through the substantial weakening of the strategic nuclear forces, first of all the naval strategic nuclear forces (both those on patrol and also those located at bases), and their command and control systems during the course of the non-nuclear period of a war using the conventional weapons of foreign navies' strike and antisubmarine forces; and, through the disruption of transport movements and economic activity in adjacent seas and other areas of the World Ocean through the destruction and seizure of civilian ships and their escort forces, and other maritime targets; through the destruction of ports or a naval blockade of the RF coastline; through the seizure of the country's safeguarded areas, first of all island and peninsula areas; through the creation of a threat from the rear and flanks of the troop formations that are defending the maritime axes through the landing of amphibious assault troops; through a blockade of naval forces in their basing areas; through the seizure of important economic, administrative-political and military targets, including sea ports, naval bases, airfields, and so forth, as a result of a ground forces offensive along a coastline; and, through the destruction of the Russian Federation's economic or military potential or of a significant portion of its population by conducting strikes against foreign navies' strategic (ballistic and cruise missiles) or tactical (missiles and bombs) nuclear weapons delivery systems.

The cited list of dangers and threats to the Russian Federation's vitally important interests can hardly be perceived with only one meaning. It certainly requires thorough analysis. We, for our part, are attempting to formulate the primary interrelated issues for that analysis. Here they are.

Do some of the listed dangers and threats to the Russian Federation's vitally important interests actually exist or could they arise in the future (and when—in time)? Are the dangers and threats created from the sea and ocean zones or in these zones more probable at the present time or in the future than, say, those that exist or could arise on other, continental, axes? Will the anticipated damage to the vitally important interests from aggressive (illegal) actions from the sea and ocean zones or in these zones be greater than that which can be inflicted by these actions against other, for example, continental axes? Which forces, weapons and methods can be used to inflict the primary damage to vitally important interests from the sea and ocean zones or in these zones? Can the Navy's efforts substantially minimize the damage to the Russian

Federation's vitally important interests from aggressive (illegal) actions from the sea and ocean zones or in these zones? If the aggressor is totally or partially deprived of the capability to operate in the sea and ocean zones, will this limit his capabilities to inflict damage to the Russian Federation's vitally important interests on the continental axes? To what degree does the Navy need support from the other services of the Armed Forces during operations in the sea and ocean zones? Are the ground troops (naval forces) of the other services of the Armed Forces capable, without the participation of the Navy, of adequately effectively defending the Russian Federation's vitally important interests from the damage which could be inflicted by aggressive (illegal) actions from the sea and ocean zones or in these zones?

There certainly can also be other questions. Balanced responses to these and other questions must determine why (to accomplish which missions, in which sea and ocean zones, with what effectiveness) Russia needs a Navy today (say, until the years 2000-2005) and tomorrow (after 2005).

However, we must stress that optimal responses to these questions are possible only in the event that instructions are received from the country's political leadership about which states today create dangers or threats to Russian Federation vitally important interests that are cited above, from whom they can arise tomorrow, which states are today or will become in the future allies of Russia, and which of today's partners could become a source of dangers or threats in the future. The list of vitally important interests must be made more precise and detailed and also instructions about which of them can be defended through diplomatic steps and the protection of which interests requires the reinforcement of diplomacy with military, including naval, might. Considering the duration of the process of creating (recreating) or reforming the Navy, these instructions must be provided for a sufficiently long duration.

At the same time, the existing experience of the employment of Russian and foreign navies permits us, without waiting for a response to the questions posed, to assume that the following mission can be assigned to the Navy to prevent military conflicts, other aggressive and illegal actions against Russia and its allies from the sea and ocean zones and in these zones, and to put a stop to violations of peace and stability in them in peacetime: 1) maintain the composition and state of the maritime strategic nuclear forces that support the guaranteed infliction of given damage to an aggressor under any conditions of the situation; prevent foreign antisubmarine warfare forces from tracking strategic nuclear missile submarine cruisers; 2) maintain the composition and state of general purpose naval forces that support repelling local and regional scale aggression; 3) detect in a timely manner aggression and other infringements against Russian Federation vitally important interests that are being prepared from the sea and ocean zones and in these zones, and also violations of international

treaties, agreements and unilateral obligations in the sphere of restricting and limiting naval arms, naval activities and other confidence-building measures; 4) safeguard the State Border in the underwater environment at sea, carry out antisubmarine and anti-terrorist defense, render support to the Border Troops in safeguarding the State Border in the naval surface environment, and to the PVO [Air Defense] troops—in the air environment; 5) participate in ensuring RF sovereignty over the exclusive economic zone, continental shelf and other areas of the World Ocean that have been transferred to RF jurisdiction and in combating terrorism, piracy, and illegal drug trafficking in adjacent seas and other areas of the World Ocean; 6) protect Russian freedom of navigation and the activity of Russian structures for the extraction of live and mineral resources in adjacent seas and other areas of the World Ocean, including civilian ships and other maritime objects from attacks by the armed forces of states that are involved in local (regional) military conflicts in which the Russian Federation is not participating; 7) realize and deepen confidence-building measures and implement and expand cooperation in the naval sphere between the Russian Federation and other states, including through participation in joint exercises with foreign navies; 8) evacuate citizens of the Russian Federation and other countries from foreign maritime states in which a threat to their security is being created; participate in the defense of the rights and freedoms, lives and property of citizens and state organizations of the Russian Federation in those foreign states where a threat to them is being created; 9) render assistance to the population, military and civilian ships, other maritime objects, and aircraft of the Russian Federation and other states that are victims of natural disasters, catastrophes or accidents that have occurred in the adjacent seas and other areas of the World Ocean; and, 10) participate in peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the UN, CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], CIS, etc., in the sea and ocean zones while carrying out: disengagement of the armed formations of the belligerent parties; delivery of humanitarian cargoes to the civilian population; evacuation of the civilian population from the conflict area, delivery of peacekeeping troop formations and materiel to support their operations to the conflict area; a naval blockade of the conflict area to ensure fulfillment of sanctions introduced by the UN; and, other types of peacekeeping operations—combat and support (for example, landing amphibious assault forces, searching for destroying naval mines, etc.).

We must bear in mind that, under certain conditions, peacekeeping operations can evolve into a local or regional war with the participation in it of the RF Armed Forces, including the Navy, far from its borders.

We think that the proposed list of Naval peacetime missions is quite realistic. This is also explained by the fact that these missions are not only actually being accomplished by the Navy today (the adequacy of the composition of the forces that are participating in their accomplishment and the geographical and time scales of the operations of these forces that are determined by the country's financial-economic capabilities and by the

degree of vital importance of the affected RF interests are another matter), but their long-term prospects are also distinctly visible.

As for the wartime missions, we must unfortunately establish their prospects since the danger of the outbreak of military conflicts, including large-scale conflicts, has not yet been eliminated. But before we formulate the wartime missions, we need to make several preliminary remarks.

First of all, it seems to be necessary to more precisely define the concept of "local war" and "regional war" and also the borders of regions in which such wars are predicted, especially if Russia's participation in them is probable to some degree or other or if such wars are possible against it. We must name, along with the foreign states of which the territories are a part, the specific sea and ocean zones, the continental portions contiguous to them that are part of these regions and, in the event of Russia's participation—its territory. The content of the response to the question "Why does Russia need a Navy?" depends on that to a significant degree.

Second, we must establish which weapons, forces and operations are being used to create the main danger (threat) for Russia of their sea and ocean zones or in these zones. Our point of view on this score is: the main danger (threat) is being created and will be created in the future by the capability of the aggressor to employ sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles, antiship missiles, naval mines and torpedoes with conventional warheads, and also amphibious assault forces. The destruction of their delivery systems will be the most effective way to minimize damage from the employment of these weapons and amphibious assaults: attack submarines, battleships, missile cruisers, destroyers and frigates, aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships and transports, and carrier-based strike, land-based patrol and strategic aviation aircraft. In the process, we make our priority the danger (threat) from sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles and naval mines. The Navy will certainly be able to accomplish this mission only with the support of the Air Force and PVO Troops.

Third, in our opinion, we must critically interpret in a new way the problem of the Navy's participation (naval strategic nuclear weapons) in nuclear deterrence and inflict appropriate damage to the aggressor (if we haven't managed to deter him). We don't want to oversimplify the problem with references to the immorality and senselessness of the nuclear deterrence strategy under contemporary conditions. We think that interpreting it in a new way should help us to find weighted responses to the following questions: Is it advisable and within its power for the Russian Federation to copy the American or French nuclear triad, bearing in mind our geopolitical, geostrategic and economic situation; will the Russian Federation attain the economic and financial capabilities to simultaneously have in the composition of the Navy (maintain and build new ones as existing ones

become obsolete) naval strategic nuclear weapons and support forces of their ability to stand up in combat, and also forces to oppose the main and other threats (already today up to 25 percent of the naval budget is being expended on maintaining the combat readiness of naval strategic nuclear weapons alone!); will the reliance on naval strategic nuclear weapons in the deterrence strategy (up to 60 percent of the warheads) not result in the collapse of this strategy due to an overestimation of the capabilities of ensuring the ability of the naval strategic nuclear forces to resist the enemy: isn't the low cost of naval strategic nuclear weapons deceiving, bearing in mind that a Tayfun strategic nuclear missile cruiser's 200 warheads can be sent to the bottom by an aggressor with 1-2 torpedoes or mines with conventional charges (or be destroyed at the base by 1-2 cruise missiles), and the aggressor can require up to 400-600 nuclear warheads to destroy 200 warheads of single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles; will naval strategic nuclear weapons not become an even more destabilizing strategic factor after the elimination of the RS-20 intercontinental ballistic missiles since each of the 308 RS-20 ICBM's has 10 warheads and there are 200 warheads on one of the six Tayfun strategic missile submarine cruisers? There certainly can be more questions. But we are inclined toward the fact that interpreting it in a new way can indicate the advisability of removing the nuclear deterrence mission from the Navy (with the preservation of this mission for the Strategic Missile Forces).

Fourth, it requires a review of the mission of assisting maritime troop formations. According to existing views, this general mission consists of a number of partial ones: inflicting destruction on an aggressor's naval task force that is carrying out combat effect against our troops or that is attempting to land an amphibious assault force (but combat with them will be carried out within the framework of opposing the main threat of their sea and ocean zones); disruption of maritime transport movements that are being carried out on behalf of enemy troops and ensuring uninterrupted maritime transport movements on behalf of our troops (it is advisable to regard this mission as an element of broader independent Naval operations on the sea and ocean lines of communication to disrupt enemy transport movements and for the defense of our own transport movements on the whole); fire support of a maritime ground force (there is no need to enlist Naval forces for fire support with the modern fire support power of large ground forces formations and their supporting aviation; if the need arises, the construction of special ships will be required to do this at the expense of those needed to oppose the main threat). A final mission remains—to support the landings of amphibious assault forces, not to "project force" on foreign territories but first of all to restore RF sovereignty over its own, especially island and peninsula, areas in the event of their seizure by an

aggressor. We need to consider the navy's accomplishment of this mission to be its assistance to ground forces on maritime axes.

Based upon the considerations set forth above, the Navy's wartime missions can generally be formulated in the following manner: 1) inflicting destruction on the aggressor Navy's main strike forces, which consist of sea-launched and air-launcher cruise missile and long and medium range antiship missile delivery systems (attack submarines, aircraft carriers, and missile surface ships); 2) inflicting destruction against amphibious assault force formations and compelling them to decline to land assault forces; 3) defense of our own sea (internal) and, in individual cases, ocean (external) military and economic transport movements and also the extraction of live sea and mineral resources in adjacent seas (and, under certain circumstances—in other areas of the World Ocean); 4) supporting amphibious assault landings; 5) disrupting the aggressor's sea and, in individual cases, ocean military and economic transport movements, including by carrying out a naval blockade of his coastline; and, 6) destruction of economic, administrative-political, and military targets, and ground and naval troop formations on the territories of aggressor states using conventional weapons.

The first three will most likely be the Navy's primary missions if a military conflict with the primary naval powers suddenly occurs. The latter three will probably turn out to be the main missions in a war with countries that are weak in the naval sense. Other variants are also possible.

But the response to the question, why does Russia need a Navy, will be incomplete if effectiveness requirements for mission accomplishment are not assigned to it since that is how the qualitative and quantitative composition of the navy and also its cost will be determined. We should not forget about that just like we should not forget that: if the Navy's effectiveness turns out to be inadequate, the other services of the Armed Forces will also be called upon to participate and we also need to take into account their possible contribution to the accomplishment of sea and ocean armed combat missions in the sea and ocean zones within the framework of a unified system of operations of the Armed Forces together with the Navy.

Baltic Fleet Commander Yegorov on Withdrawal

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[Interview with Baltic Fleet Commander Admiral Vladimir Grigoryevich Yegorov, by A. Kostin, occasion, date and place not specified, under rubric "Time and the Fleet": "We Must Be Realists"; photograph of Yegorov included]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Among numerous problems which the Navy is forced to solve today (as are the Russian*

Federation Armed Forces as a whole, by the way), the question of withdrawing its personnel and equipment from stationing locations which now have gone back to sovereign republics is one of the most pressing. It also concerns one of the Navy components, the Twice-Honored Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Today Baltic Fleet Commander Admiral V. Yegorov shares his thoughts on the situation of Russia's oldest fleet.

[Kostin] Vladimir Grigoryevich, how do you assess the status of the Baltic Fleet in the present situation, which is by no means easy?

[Yegorov] Like many asking this question today, you probably have in mind above all the withdrawal of our ships and units from the Baltic, but I would not like to limit myself to this framework. The fact is that if we speak about the Baltic Fleet—as well as about the Navy as a whole, by the way—then it is necessary to view its situation in light of the aggregate of all problems and not just the loss of stationing locations in Baltic countries, for example. The situation is such that we have been forced to reduce the ship order of battle by three times in the last ten years. True, above all we tried to remove from it that which had become obsolete and that simply would be unwise and burdensome to maintain today under conditions of economic crisis. The Navy's table of organization structure also was changed accordingly: the number of personnel was cut in half.

But in my view, it would not be quite correct to say that we became considerably weaker in doing so. Today we have as much as necessary to perform missions specified by our state's military doctrine. It must be taken into account that the numerical strengths and fleets of other countries are being reduced in the Baltic, especially that of Germany, which has a rather stable economic situation in contrast to Russia. But it also must not be forgotten that the fleet always has been and is an instrument aimed at realization of the state's foreign policy, which means it must be capable of performing this important function.

Of course, it cannot help but be disappointing to me, as it is to every navyman, when rather modern ships also are removed from the Navy order of battle. For example, I can judge about the Kiev and Baku, familiar to everyone, from more than hearsay, inasmuch as I had occasion to perform missions aboard them in the Mediterranean. And it is distressing that these two Navy flagships, as well as a third, Novorossiysk, did not live to the age specified for them during construction. I will repeat, however, that there are objective reasons for this, above all of an economic nature, and their solution is the prerogative of appropriate state structures, but I am deeply convinced that these solutions cannot be put off.

[Kostin] Still, I would like to know how the Baltic Fleet's loss of a considerable number of naval bases, which remained on the territory of Baltic countries, affected its vital activities.

[Yegorov] The loss of any possession is a misfortune both for the individual and for the entire state. Of course we cannot help but regret that we lost our best bases, which took more than a single year to build. Correspondingly, this also could not help but affect both Fleet combat readiness and the morale of people now forced to make themselves a home in new places.

From this aspect 1992, when many officers, including prospective officers, decided to part company with the Fleet, was especially difficult for us. The housing problem, probably the most pressing for us today, and problems of a financial nature, where wages in civilian life exceed an officer's pay by five times or more, also played their negative role here. Believe me, I cannot blame them for this. Until the state assesses the labor of people in shoulderboards in accordance with the outlays of their moral and physical energy and solves the entire set of social problems, including housing, people—and take note that they are rather good people—will continue to leave us.

We were not just losing during these three years, however, but were constantly seeking opportunities and did a great deal to preserve, for example, the Fleet command and control system, having modernized it so it meets the level of modern demands. But while we succeeded in the latter to some extent, things are considerably worse with basing system problems, for in order to provide people with housing, for example, and provide ships with necessary berthing space we need billions in investments and, most important, time, which limits us. And berthing space itself is only one component, albeit an important one, of the basing system, which in addition to naval bases includes an interrelated complex of airfields and other facilities prepared in advance on shore and on islands and intended for comprehensive support to combat and day-to-day activity of Fleet formations and units. It is understandable that we were incapable of getting such a bulky and cumbersome thing going in three years, especially under conditions of financial starvation, if we take into account, moreover, that we left real property in the Baltic states amounting to R48 billion in 1984 prices.

[Kostin] But insofar as we know, another problem of no small importance to the Baltic Fleet is that six of our previous seven Fleet ship repair yards presently remain on the territory of Baltic countries. As archive documents attest, it was the Russian Empire that invested tens of millions of rubles in gold to construct the majority of them by buying the lands from their owners, i.e., long before the so-called "Soviet occupation." Can we not try to attempt to resolve what is now the problem of their joint operation in a civilized manner? The fact is, Fleet personnel, albeit former ones, also work there, and 98 percent are Russian...

[Yegorov] There have been such attempts, although the question of setting up joint ventures based on our former ship repair yards such as in Riga and Liyepaya still has not been resolved once and for all. Speaking of the

position of the present heads of these enterprises, they are not against cooperating with us and have raised this question with the Baltic Fleet staff more than once now, especially as, according to our information, neither yard is being kept busy with orders today and so they are forced to stand idle. But unfortunately there are difficulties of an economic nature for us in this matter: we are in debt to these yards for large sums in view of the limited nature of Fleet financing.

True, there also is a positive example of such cooperation. It concerns the creation of a health-improvement joint venture based on our former Rizhskoye vzmorye and Mayori sanatoria. The Navy commander in chief played a major role here; while in Yurmala he met with the city deputy mayor at the latter's initiative and received a prior agreement for joint operation of Mayori. Appropriate documents were signed by the Latvian side and by representatives of the Russian State Committee for Administration of State Property. Under this agreement our sanatorium chief becomes deputy director of the joint venture and the Fleet will have 450 places in a treatment and health-improvement establishment outfitted with everything necessary. But unfortunately, this is an isolated example for now.

[Kostin] On the other hand, insofar as we know, there are positive examples of another nature. The withdrawal of personnel and ships not only is a labor-intensive affair, but, as shown by experience in certain sovereign states of the former USSR, also is often fraught with opposition, including armed opposition, from new local authorities. Nevertheless, there have been no special excesses during redeployment of the Baltic Fleet. How did you succeed in achieving this?

[Yegorov] First of all, we adjusted contacts both with heads of state as well as with those who were receiving installations from us, although of course there were attempts to provoke us onto the path of confrontation. Suffice it to recall the familiar story of the kidnapping of Colonel (now Major General) Chernykh, the commander of a coast defense division. We had to apply no small efforts to help get the officer out of a prison cell. There were attempts to seize some of our installations also by nongovernment armed units such as Zemessargs and (Kaitseleit). But we must give the appropriate agencies their due: we knew about impending provocations in advance and so did not succumb to them. Moreover, I will repeat, we tried to inform the leadership of the Baltic states about all of our steps; accordingly, in the majority of cases they also met us halfway. It was largely for this reason that we succeeded in accomplishing the mission of withdrawing ships and units by civilized methods.

[Kostin] Vladimir Grigoryevich, your entry into the position of commander practically coincided with the beginning of withdrawal of Fleet forces from Baltic countries. Therefore we assume you have full right and grounds to make a comparison: with the leadership of which of the

three states did the most constructive relationships form for the Fleet command element, and with which one was it the other way around?

[Yegorov] I must make a reservation: the Baltic Fleet command element and staff resolve all problems involving withdrawal of Fleet forces not in isolation, but in close coordination of their actions with the Russian ministries of Defense and of Foreign Affairs and, of course, with the Navy command element and Main Naval Staff. Not long ago Andrey Vladimirovich Kozyrev visited us in Baltiysk and met with officers. We presented our requests and wishes to him, including about the issue of traveling passports, without which it is now impossible to travel across Lithuania from Kaliningrad Oblast to the main territory of Russia and back. I must note that this problem, with which we struggled without results for more than a year, was solved literally at once by the minister of foreign affairs. And the assistance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs moved our relations with authorities of the Baltic republics to a higher level—one could say a state level.

Now Russian embassies and consulates have opened in all countries of this region. While representatives of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic states prior to this took all problems exclusively to senior naval officials, who often were not in a position to solve them because of their status, now people can turn to the diplomats. You will agree that their capabilities for solving such problems are cannot be compared with those of fleet officers or even admirals.

Speaking about with whom we have formed the most constructive relations, it unquestionably is with Lithuania. Minister of Defense General of the Army Grachev met on 25 May 1992 with his Lithuanian colleague, Mr. Butkevicius, and it was then it was decided to transfer certain armament and two ships to this country in exchange for its construction of housing for our servicemen being withdrawn from Baltic countries. Such mutual relations are being maintained even now. Thus, this year Minister of Defense Linas Linkevicius and Lithuanian Republic Presidential Adviser Rimantas Andritis were present with us at the celebration of Navy Day in Kaliningrad. The Lithuanian minister suggested that our ships (as was the case previously as well) pay visits to their ports, particularly Klaipeda, during the celebration of the Sea holiday there. Good relations also have formed for us with Lithuanian Flotilla Commander Commodore Raimondas Baltushkas, in the recent past the chief navigator of the Baltic Fleet. We also maintain ties with the heads of the Latvian Ministry of Defense, especially with this state's Navy commander, Naval Captain Gaidis Zebots, also a former captain 1st rank and commander of a Baltic Fleet ship division. We have known each other since the time he was still a captain-lieutenant and I am sure we will continue to be friends.

In Estonia I have had occasion to decide questions both with the president and the prime minister. They

regarded our problems with understanding and made decisions suiting both sides.

[Kostin] Vladimir Grigoryevich, in your view what questions require the fastest solution along with the basing system problem?

[Yegorov] I will repeat that the housing question is the most important one. Like it or not, the Baltic Fleet had the very best housing not just anywhere, but in the Baltic. Even a young lieutenant or warrant officer waited for his own "place" there for a maximum of a year or a year and a half. It is another situation in Kaliningrad and Leningrad oblasts, where even before this the people would wait a long time to receive apartments and, as you understand, the situation has been exacerbated even more under present circumstances, especially as we have a debt of many billions to builders who are accomplishing the task of settling Fleet forces in new stationing locations. This problem must be solved, and urgently, to prevent a fluctuation of cadres and the Fleet's loss of the best people, who decide its combat readiness. Of course, we could do this enormously faster if we had the means, but...

The second problem is providing Fleet forces with everything necessary. In particular, the absence of a transit agreement between Russia and Lithuania is affecting this very seriously. Let's take the question of delivering fuel, for example. It can be purchased from Russian plants at a relatively cheap price, but it becomes enormously more costly as you transport it to Kaliningrad Oblast because of all the customs duties and tariffs. It is better to deliver fuel by the sea route, which is three times cheaper than transporting it across Lithuanian territory. And if Fleet oilers are used, this will reduce expenses even more, although we have our own difficulties here connected with the shortage of specialized vessels, insufficient outfitting of port fuel terminals and so on. Therefore we are studying this question by direction of the minister of defense, and I think we will find the most economical way of supplying the Fleet.

The next burning question is nonpayments. It is well that a decree of the Russian Government came out about relieving military units of energy inspection sanctions, although it would appear that this too is no solution to the problem. But for us even such a decree is a "breath of fresh air": steps previously being taken to turn off electrical power to certain Fleet installations could lead to dangerous consequences. For example, power was repeatedly turned off at one of our airfields, and during night flight operations. Of course, there are reserve options for providing electrical energy for such instances, but still, imagine how this might have ended.

I would make specifically those three problems of paramount importance, inasmuch as we are incapable of solving them independently and solutions here are required at a state level. But the majority of the remaining questions, including, let's say, ship repair, are fully within the power of the Baltic Fleet. In particular,

we can build up the capacities of the Fleet yard, and a project for expanding it already is being developed. We also are being helped by the Yantar Shipyard. This is to say that the Fleet command element has not been nor is it now in a state of despair. I will say more: we look optimistically to the future.

[Kostin] Since you have begun speaking about prospects, I would like to know how you see the future of Russia's oldest fleet?

[Yegorov] We are working on completing what the minister of defense assigned us to do by 1 January 1995. To be brief, the Fleet will consist of two groupings based in Leningrad and Kaliningrad oblasts. No movements of Fleet headquarters to St. Petersburg are planned, although such conversations were held at a very high level. This is impossible to do now if only out of economic considerations. But speaking of the Baltic Fleet's prospects, in my view the table of organization changes being planned will permit having a compact, reliably manageable Fleet with a rather serious potential for defending Russia's interests in the Baltic.

I emphasize that I am speaking specifically about a fleet and not about a flotilla or squadron, to which level some are trying to reduce us. The situation must be viewed realistically: all states of the Baltic region with the exception of those recently formed specifically have fleets in the makeup of their armed forces, and not some kind of other large strategic formations or formations. And inasmuch as the "window to Europe" cut through by Peter the Great has to be defended, then Russia cannot get by without a well-equipped, combat-effective Baltic Fleet, as it also cannot get by, by the way, without a Navy as a whole.

Concerning Northern Test Range and Nuclear Weapons

95UM0053B Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 9, Sep 94 pp 11-13

[Article by Vice-Admiral G. Zolotukhin under rubric "Reflections Over a Date"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Beginning in 1946 the United States was intensively developing its nuclear weapons, including for use at sea. The USSR Government's answering action was to establish a second nuclear range (after Semipalatinsk) in 1954 on islands of Novaya Zemlya, where it would be possible to conduct underwater tests as well as superpowerful explosions.

That is how construction began on the naval scientific test range on Novaya Zemlya, which was 40 years old on 17 September.

We present for your attention reflections on the fate of this once top secret installation by one of the journal's permanent authors, who quite recently was chief of a Main Naval Staff directorate and to whom this range was subordinate in a special sense.

In 1990 the U.S. journal DEFENSE NEWS published an article devoted to a comparison of military potentials of the two world camps, including their nuclear forces. For the umpteenth time, it stressed that there can be no winners in a nuclear war. At the same time, an interesting conclusion was drawn: "The nuclear deterrent is effective. It does not permit war. As a matter of fact, it is because of this deterrent that peace has been preserved in Europe for 45 years, and this is its most lengthy period on the continent over the last four centuries. Thus, we should keep our nuclear deterrent inviolable. We continue to live in a world of military might, and our nuclear deterrent is that very force which preserves the peace."

Since that time major changes have occurred on the planet, first and foremost concerning the former socialist camp and its "nuclear shield," the USSR, which ceased its existence, to put it mildly, after several years of stubborn "perestroika," ending with events familiar to all. A bit later the thesis of the end of the "cold war" also was solemnly proclaimed. But despite this and all existing treaties, western countries have not rejected the need to have nuclear weapons and further upgrade them, about which mention will be made a bit later. But here, especially in the perestroika years, the press began a heated campaign aimed both against nuclear weapons as well as nuclear testing. The advisability of the Northern Range's existence was called into question accordingly.

Like all my colleagues from the military who were and are dealing with nuclear weapons and their tests and so picture rather clearly the consequences of nuclear explosions, I support in every way the thought being advanced today that mankind should enter the 21st century without such devastating weapons, but still would like to caution against euphoria concerning an easy solution to this global problem. In my view, simply to reject nuclear weapons and nuclear tests, and unilaterally at that, without an appropriate military-political analysis of the world situation means being like a person who closes his umbrella in a downpour, resting hopes on the fact that it is not too cold. (By the way, were we to have yielded to the "painful attempts" of people largely attempting to play the "Novaya Zemlya card" in their own selfish interests, we would have been deprived of the Northern Range back in 1985. Even though Semipalatinsk today is nearer for Russia, it is the near abroad, and as a result Russia would have ended up as Pushkin's old woman back at square one.)

But an analysis shows that there still are too many obstacles on the path to a non-nuclear world, and this unquestionably progressive idea hardly will be implemented in the foreseeable future. For example, the latest events, such as surrounding the North Korean nuclear center, indicate that new members soon may join the world "nuclear club." It is not just a question of North Korea. Countries working on nuclear weapon problems include Iraq, Israel, Japan, the Republic of South Africa... The "selective" approach to them on the part of certain countries of the world community, above all the

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United States, also cannot help but be surprising. It "brandishes a club" in front of some like North Korea, but merely "wags a little finger" at others, closing its eyes to purchases of high-tech equipment permitting the conduct of nuclear research. Such a position by no means reinforces the authority of the international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Is that not why neither India, which exploded a nuclear device back in 1974, nor Pakistan, which conducted successful laboratory tests of nuclear weapons in 1987, have wished to accede to it up to now, regarding it as discriminatory? But the fact is, this region is in the "underbelly" of Russia and is rather highly explosive because of controversial territorial problems, including over the Indian state of Kashmir.

But while it is possible to speak about creation only of first generation nuclear weapons by the countries enumerated (by the way, the word "only" is very conditional here: suffice it to recall Hiroshima and Nagasaki, wiped from the face of the Earth specifically with the first U.S. atomic bombs), leading nuclear states are coming close to the third generation. This is indicated if only by the fact that directed-energy nuclear weapons have been discussed for more than a single year now even in the open western press. Development of neutron weapons as well as the SDI nuclear program, although suspended for now, can be included here.

Experience shows that no one has a special wish to share new technological developments with Russia, and even less so in this area, which is strategic. So will we not end up behind everyone, having confirmed the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing as successor to the USSR? The fact is that assertions that nuclear charges can be improved without full-scale tests should it be necessary are groundless and are used by some only as proof of the "advisability" and "possibility" of introducing a unilateral ban on them. (True, the fact is somewhat reassuring here that four of the five leading nuclear powers—Russia, United States, France and China—did not conduct a single nuclear test during 1992-1993, and England gave them up earlier. On the other hand, the PRC did this already in the current year, and the others just did not officially accede to the Russian moratorium.) Even so, is it precluded, for example, that this same United States will break away in creating and stockpiling a new generation of nuclear weapons and, manipulating the opinion of the world community, will force the possessors of old nuclear weapons to destroy them, and that Russia will be left with nothing at all?

The position of a country possessing nuclear weapons and not planning to reject them in the next 5-10 years (which goes directly for Russia if we follow the declaration of our President about the status of nuclear weapons on its territory) also is aggravated by the fact that nuclear tests accomplish other important tasks in addition to testing new nuclear charges.

The first one is maintaining the necessary level of combat readiness of existing nuclear ammunition. Like

all sophisticated devices, and devices hazardous to handle at that, they require periodic inspection. When nuclear weapons began to be created, the most rigid requirements were placed on measures for their safe handling. A precise system of organizational and technical measures was set up both in troops using nuclear munitions as well as in industry, and the inspection never was departmental, as some attempt to depict it. Its means and methods are constantly upgraded based on the latest achievements of science and engineering. The most reliable inspection is done in industry by a complete disassembly of nuclear ammunition and an inspection of the serviceability of all its assemblies. But the most modern inspection methods do not permit sufficiently reliable forecasting of the serviceability of the nuclear charge, the main assembly of any nuclear ammunition, which determines its combat capabilities, effectiveness and safety in day-to-day handling. The physical configuration and design of modern nuclear charges is too complex, and final confirmation of their serviceability and necessary level of safety under modern conditions is realistic only as a result of conducting a nuclear explosion, i.e., a full-scale check.

Thus, the very presence of nuclear weapons in a country requires conducting nuclear tests. Without them, available nuclear ammunition inevitably will become morally and physically obsolete like any equipment, inasmuch as even though it has a lengthy guaranteed period, it is nevertheless a limited one. Consequently, if we assume that we have taken new nuclear ammunition into the inventory, its moral and physical aging will begin to tell after approximately ten years, and after a few more years of not conducting nuclear tests the country essentially will end up without nuclear weapons meeting the demands of the time. As a result of the development of countermeasures, such weapons will be useless from a military standpoint and dangerous with day-to-day handling. And so you have the solution to the question of just why, in response to our repeated establishment of unilateral moratoriums and calls to accede to them, the United States declared the need to conduct nuclear tests as long as at least one nuclear charge remained in the U.S. Army and Navy inventory.

Accomplishment of the second task—checking the explosion hazard of nuclear charges, including in abnormal emergency situations, in group storage and during transportation—acquires special significance under present conditions. I wish to note right away that modern nuclear ammunition is completely safe in handling with observance of conditions stipulated in operating and servicing documents, i.e., its safety is ensured by the design and by organizational-technical measures. Hence also the rigid conditions for access to these weapons. And the established operating and servicing system proved its effectiveness over the more than 30 years of experience in using nuclear ammunition in the troops.

But more and more accidents have been occurring in transportation in the country in recent years and their

seriousness is growing. Unfortunately, one also cannot exclude sabotage, and organizational-technical measures alone are not enough here. Research of recent years has shown that just initiation of the nuclear charge explosive (i.e., we are not talking about any kind of nuclear explosion) can lead to dispersion of nuclear fuel at the accident site, but even this may have catastrophic consequences. The radius of the zone of immediate evacuation of the populace will be tens of kilometers, and that of the zone for taking necessary preventive measures (with possible resettlement of people) will be even hundreds of kilometers. This problem has troubled developers from the moment nuclear weapons appeared, but only the latest achievements of science and engineering

permit posing the question of creating nuclear charges that are fully safe in any emergency situations. Industry has corresponding technical studies, but their practical realization involves a change in physical configurations of charges and the use of new materials and technologies, and this in turn again requires nuclear testing.

Therefore it turns out that Russia cannot get by for now without the Northern Range, if of course it wishes to retain the status of a nuclear power that is reckoned with in the world. And only when the last nuclear munition in the world is destroyed will it be possible to say that the Novaya Zemlya Range fulfilled its missions. How soon this will depend on the wisdom of mankind.

UKRAINE

Military Vows To Destroy Conventional Arms

95UM0063A Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian 1 Nov 94 p 2

[Unattributed news item: "Without Destroying Fighting Ability"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ministry of Defense, in accordance with the plan for cutbacks in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, is carrying out the corresponding organizational measures to reform some military units. Some of their hardware and matériel is subject to elimination or sale.

So as to avoid any loose interpretations that could arise as a result of a failure to understand the overall situation, such as occurred at the Ovrutskyy garrison, the press center of the Ministry of Defense elaborates that Ukraine, in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, is to eliminate a certain quantity of combat hardware and weaponry. Physically obsolete logistical matériel whose maintenance would have no effect on the fighting ability of the army, but that is economically burdensome and inefficient, is subject to liquidation.

The plan for the cutbacks in the armed forces of Ukraine provides for the transfer of some military compounds and institutions to the national economy. The list of those facilities will be determined after a diligent review of the need of the Armed Forces for them. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine is carrying out all official measures to cut back the Armed Forces according to a scientifically substantiated program, in the interests of maintaining a suitable level of defensive capability for the state.

Leaders Gather To Deal With Manning & Mobilization Problems

Leaders Meet in Rivne

95UM0043A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
24 Sep 94 p 1

[Unattributed news item: "In Order To Raise Mobilization Readiness"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Problems in the interaction of military bodies with the structures of local administration were at the center of attention during a mobilization conference that was held in Rivne by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The leaders of the military commissariats of the Republic of Crimea and the oblasts of Ukraine were made familiar with progressive practices in this sphere, and conducted a number of exercises during which the actions to call citizens obligated for military service into the ranks were practiced. The

participants in the meeting visited motor-vehicle enterprises and studied organizational-mobilization work in rural areas for the assembly of reservists.

Hurin, Venher Meet With Military Commissars

95UM0043B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
24 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA special correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Nykyfor Lysytsya: "The Military Commissars Are Training"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A training conference of the leaders of the oblast and Crimean republic military commissars was held the other day in Rivne under the leadership of First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Lieutenant-General Hennadiy Hurin. The selection of the location for the conference was no accident. The Rivne oblast military commissariat, after all, headed by Colonel Viktor Hovorin, is one of the best in Ukraine: modern hardware, a streamlined system of transmitting and processing information etc.

The chief purpose of this function, as indicated by General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate Chief Major-General Valeriy Venher, was a reorientation of the work guidelines relative to the new economic and socio-political conditions. The military commissars were assembled to exchange information and jointly develop recommendations for those who are directly engaged in calling up the youth, forming military reserve cadre personnel, preparing mobilization resources etc. and, finally, to train themselves, since commissars are not trained at any educational institution.

The businesslike tone of the assembly was set by Lieutenant-General Hennadiy Hurin, who analyzed in his presentation the state of combat and mobilization readiness in the military commissariats of our country. He was not, by the way, entirely satisfied, and some of those present got to hear quite sharp criticism addressed to them. How to improve the situation was discussed simultaneously, and concrete advice was given.

Major-General Valeriy Venher devoted his speech to the problems of the draft for military service. The past year and this spring were not easy for him, but even more difficulties lie ahead. Replacements are needed, owing to the discharge of two drafts into the reserves at the same time in the spring of this year. Reserves for that do exist, it is true: some oblasts are sending only twenty percent of the overall number of draftees to the armed forces. It is only necessary to work persistently here for the draft campaign to take place in organized and energetic fashion.

First Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate for Indoctrination Work, Major-General Hryhoriy Temko, also spoke to the conference participants. He shared his

thoughts with regard to improving indoctrination work with draftees and improving screening for military service.

The participants both heard and saw a great deal that was useful to them. All of this will facilitate improvements in the work of such important institutions as the military commissariats.

Major-General Venher Interviewed on Call-Up, Shortened Tours

95UM0043C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
11 Oct 94 p 2

[Interview with Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate Chief Major-General Valeriy Safronovych Venher by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Oleksandr Tereverko under the rubric: "Topical Interview": "The Term of Service Will Be a Year and a Half From Now On"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The edict of the President of Ukraine and the corresponding order from the Ministry of Defense, "The Discharge Into the Reserves of Servicemen and the Regular Drafting of Citizens of Ukraine for Conscript Military Service in October—December 1994," came out at the end of September. The servicemen who were drafted in October—December 1992 for 24 months and those called up in March—June 1993 for 18 months will be discharged in accordance with them. That is to say, should the provisions of both the edict of the president and the order of the Minister of Defense be taken to mean that the term of service for soldiers and NCOs will be a year and a half? Such questions were contained in many letters to the editors from servicemen on conscript service and their parents. That is why our correspondent, Lieutenant-Colonel Oleksandr Tereverko, asked Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate [HOMU] Chief Major-General Valeriy Venher to explain.*

[Venher] If we want to build a law-governed state, then his majesty the Law should hold sway here. So what kind of a thing is it where a youth is drafted into the armed forces, and does not know for how long? Parents have no idea when their son will be coming home again. The President thus entirely justly resolved to dot the "i's" and eliminate the differences that existed recently between the presidential edict and the resolution by the parliament. The term of service in the armed forces of Ukraine will be 18 months from now on.

Quite a few difficulties are of course arising in the ranks in the organization of combat training, support for the vital activity of military collectives, and the supply of matériel and military compounds since the discharge of the two drafts into the reserves. I think that the search for opportunities to maintain the fighting ability of units in the face of the discharge of two drafts will be a fruitful one nonetheless, and the problems will be resolved in time. As for manpower acquisition for the troops, the

requirements of the communications units, the command-and-control systems and the PPO [air-defense] forces will be satisfied first of all.

[Tereverko] Valeriy Safronovych, a training conference for the officers of the oblast and Crimean republic military commissariats was held recently in Rivne. Most of the time was allotted to questions of the mobilization work of the military commissariats, but the problems of the draft were not left out either.

[Venher] The problems associated with the work of the military commissariats on the draft were of course considered as well. We are very agitated, for example, by the cases where some of the officials of the military commissariats are granting deferments to citizens from the draft for conscript service without legal grounds for doing so. The military commissars have been strictly warned about not permitting such instances, and have been granted the right to take the most decisive measures toward those officials who disregard the requirements of law.

We came to the conclusion at the training conference that the naming of the deputy chairmen of the city or rayon soviets as the chairmen of the draft commissions is not advisable. The sessions of the commissions take place without the participation of the chairman, owing to his being overloaded with his primary work. We want to come forward with the proposal that the duties of the chairman of the draft commissions be performed by the military commissar.

The necessity has long since become acute to enlist military physicians on the medical commissions, so that they monitor the correctness of the determination of the diagnosis of this or that illness in a draftee who is making a claim for a deferment.

There is another serious issue that requires resolution as well—the monitoring of those citizens who received a deferment from the draft at one time for a year or two. Unfortunately not all of the military commissariats keep track of when the necessity for the deferment has passed—either the youth has gotten rid of the illness, or some other concessions. I will give you an example. A young man was the sole provider for his mother, and could not by law be drafted into the army. But a misfortune occurred a year later—the mother passed away. The youth had no other concessions, and he was subject to the draft. Is the military commissariat monitoring that? Our directorate is currently conducting a review of the military commissariats of Kiev, in order to ascertain instances where the deferment has lost its legal force.

During the training conference the military commissars favored holding special classes with physicians, at which questions pertaining to the list of illnesses whose presence gives the right to a deferment could be reviewed. It should be pointed out that those classes are extremely

necessary, because the medical aspect itself causes the greatest losses of time in the work of the draft commissions.

We have directed the attention of the military commissars of the southern oblasts and the Republic of Crimea to the fact that they have to organize the draft campaign under unfavorable sanitary and epidemiological conditions. The scourge of cholera has not yet been eliminated, and we thus need to display wariness and considerable diligence during the draft. It cannot be permitted in any instance that there be an outbreak of cholera in the military collectives.

These are the issues that we discussed with the military commissars during the training conference.

[Tereverko] Can you predict the draft campaign in the Republic of Crimea, given the instability of the political situation?

[Venher] I would not relegate Crimea to any special category. The situation there was not much better in the spring, but the officials of the rayon and Sevastopol city and republic military commissariats handled their targets successfully anyway. I feel that the draft in Crimea will go no worse than in the spring as well.

[Tereverko] Valeriy Safronovych, some of the mass media have been fanning the issue that the parents of the youth from the eastern part of Ukraine do not want their sons to serve in western regions, and vice versa. They cite, among other reasons, the outbreak of conflicts and instances of harassment.

[Venher] This is precisely a case where your journalist brethren are trying to see a problem that does not exist out of a solitary incident. This is all presented in sensational fashion, in "vivid" colors, making the parents become uneasy. I will not hide the fact that instances of barracks hooliganism unfortunately do exist in the army collectives. But to give a coloration of a regional or national nature to a conflict between, for example, a youth from Kherson and his contemporary from Lviv is, to put it mildly, not serious. It seems to me that the time for such sensationalism has passed, no one is amazed by it anymore. Material in the newspaper that a subunit has gotten rid of non-regulation relations could be considered sensational. Such instances do exist among the military units.

[Tereverko] The press center of the General Procuracy of Ukraine recently disseminated information that during inspections in the western region that were performed by military procurators, instances of the violation of the requirements of the Law of Ukraine "Universal Military Obligation and Military Service" by some military commissars were revealed. A number of military commissars were dismissed from their posts, and the Ministry of Defense was petitioned for their discharge from the ranks of the armed forces. What comments do you have on this instance?

[Venher] I indicated at the start of our discussion that we must all live according to the laws of the nation. Anyone who violates the requirements of the laws should be liable for it, and there should be no other thoughts on the subject. Commit a violation—be liable. Only thus will we be able to instill order in our own home—in Ukraine and in the armed forces. Only thus will we be able to approach the threshold of the law-governed state.

[Tereverko] Valeriy Safronovych, I would like to take advantage of the opportunity to ask you your impressions of your recent trip to the countries of the former Yugoslavia, where Ukrainian servicemen are performing a peacekeeping mission.

[Venher] The Balkans are an area infested with mines, abandoned populated areas, tens of thousands of refugees, and everyday danger for those who came there to restore peace among peoples. The peacekeeping duties being performed by our Ukrainian boys in the 60th and 240th Detached Battalions are very crucial and difficult. I was convinced of that personally. And it was nice to hear from the leader of the peacekeeping forces that our servicemen are not inferior to their counterparts from other countries in their preparation. Some tasks are given exclusively to the Ukrainian battalions to carry out, by virtue of the high quality of their training.

I was personally convinced of the fact that we must send to the war in the Balkans more of those who have life experience, that is, give priority to contract servicemen. They adapt more quickly, and orient themselves more confidently in the difficult circumstances. The example of the 60th Battalion, which is manned with more contract servicemen, is proving that in practice. Overall, as the chief of the HOMU, I drew certain conclusions from the trip that have to be embodied in concrete matters that, I feel, would be useful.

Shmarov's Travels, Arms Production, Conversion Efforts Noted

Shmarov Discusses Space Cooperation With Canadians

95UM0060A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
27 Oct 94 p 1

[Article by Viktor Chamara of Ukrinform, Toronto—Edmonton, October 26: "Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Ukraine Valeriy Shmarov: 'Our Cooperation Has Great Prospects'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A treaty on military cooperation between Ukraine and Canada, as well as a memorandum directed toward its practical realization, provides for the training of military specialists in Ukraine for the Land of the Maple Leaf, and in Canada for Ukraine, and their exchange for the purpose of internships and the mutual study of experience in the organization and building of the Armed Forces, particularly topical for Ukraine today, along with joint Ukrainian-Canadian activity

with regard to the strengthening of peace in both of their regions and in the world as a whole; all of this was declared in an exclusive interview with a special correspondent of Ukrinform by Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Ukraine Valeriy Shmarov. He signed the indicated documents in the name of the Ukrainian delegation, which is making a state visit to Canada led by President Leonid Kuchma.

Valeriy Shmarov indicated, in answering a question regarding the prospects for cooperation in the realm of space, that Canada, even in the absence of a cosmodrome and satellite launch vehicles, has much prestige in the manufacture of space hardware, especially satellites for various purposes, has found its place in the international division of labor in this field and is quite active in the international space market. During the negotiations with the Canadian Space Agency, continued the Vice Prime Minister, we planned out a series of areas for cooperation, among them joint research in the area of space science, the creation and utilization of satellites for monitoring the Earth's surface, and a number of others, including the question of the possible use of Ukrainian launch vehicles, and the Zenit, its Zenit-3 version and the Tsiklon in particular, for the placement of commercial satellites in orbit. There was also an exchange of ideas with regard to the possibility of the future utilization of our converted strategic missile launch stages that are subject to cutbacks under the START-I Treaty.

There are understandably no concrete technical plans aimed at implementing the agreements yet. The first step toward them was taken in Toronto, and there is no doubt that a close partnership will make it possible to make less expensive the work of both the Ukrainians and the Canadians in those areas that will bring significant mutual benefit.

Shmarov Meets With Canadian Military Leaders

95UM0060B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
27 Oct 94 p 1

[Unattributed news item: "Ukraine—Canada: Treaty on Military Relations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Ukraine Valeriy Shmarov met with Minister of National Defense and Veterans Affairs of Canada David M. Colenette, General Director of the Canadian Space Agency Ralph Mamen and executives of the firm of SPLR Aerospace. The result was the signing of a treaty between the governments of Ukraine and Canada on military relations, and a memorandum of mutual understanding between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Ministry of National Defense of Canada in the realm of bilateral military relations.

The announcement of the Canadians of their readiness to grant Ukraine credit of 20 million dollars, as well as technical assistance in the amount of 23.8 million dollars and direct financial assistance in the amount of 10

million American dollars, was testimony to the constructive nature of the Ottawa round of the Ukrainian-Canadian negotiations.

Domestic Railroad Passenger Car Production

95UM0060C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
27 Oct 94 p 1

[Unattributed article entitled: "Ukraine To Produce Passenger Rail Cars

[FBIS Translated Text] In order to guarantee the demands of railroad transport for passenger rail cars produced in-country, the Ukraine Cabinet of Ministers adopted the Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Machine Building Industry's proposal on the organization of production of these rail cars for 1994 through 1998.

The Ministry of Transport is designated as purchaser, and the joint-stock company, Kryukivskyy Rail Car Production Plant, is the main developer of construction documentation, and the producer of the passenger rail cars. The function of chief scientific organization for issues of passenger rail car construction is given to the Ukrainian State Scientific Research Institute for Rail Car Construction.

Chernihiv Military Plant To Overhaul Diesel Engines, Tractors

95UM0060D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
27 Oct 94 p 4

[Text of advertisement]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Military Plant 171

The Chernihiv Military plant offers to industrial and agricultural enterprises the overhaul of D-6, D-12, SMD-60 and SMD-62 diesel engines and the overhaul of T-150K and T-155K tractors.

We guarantee a high level of repairs and the maintenance of all of the principal technical characteristics of the tractors and engines.

Address: 250029, city of Chernihiv, vul. O. Koshovoho

Telephone: 5-27-90, 5-28-90, 5-39-53.

Arms Reduction Requires Well-Formulated Plan

95UM0060E Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
28 Oct 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Cutbacks in the Armed Forces Require Good Sense"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ministry of Defense, in accordance with the plan for cutbacks in the armed forces of Ukraine, is carrying out the corresponding

organizational measures to reform some military units. Some of their hardware and matériel is subject to elimination or sale.

The press service of the Ministry of Defense, so as to avoid any loose interpretations that could arise as a result of a misunderstanding of the overall situation, as indeed occurred at the Ovrutskyy garrison where the tank formation was reformed into a weapons and hardware storage base, elaborates that Ukraine, in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, is to eliminate a certain quantity of combat hardware and weaponry. Physically obsolete logistical matériel whose maintenance has no effect on the fighting ability of the army, but is economically burdensome and inefficient, is subject to liquidation.

The plan for the cutbacks in the armed forces of Ukraine provides for the transfer of some military compounds and institutions to the national economy. The list of those facilities will be determined after a diligent review of the need of the armed forces for them.

The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine is carrying out all official measures to cut back the armed forces according to a scientifically substantiated program, in the interests of maintaining a suitable level of defensive capability for the state.

Conversion From Missile to Streetcar Production

95UM0060F Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
3 Nov 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Streetcars Instead of Missile and Space Hardware"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A presentation of the Ukrainian-Czech joint venture "Tram-Pivden" and the first electric streetcars assembled in the shops of this former defense plant was held in Dnipropetrovsk. The founders of the joint venture include the Czech joint-stock company ChKD—Tatra, the Pivdenmash Association and the Odessa city executive committee. Advanced models of electrical cars from the Czech Republic were taken as the basis of the Tram-Pivden streetcars, whence all of the constituent parts first came as well. The Ukrainian machine builders, however, have the intention of assimilating the output of almost all of the parts and assemblies themselves by the end of next year.

Ukraine, by assimilating the output of streetcars in Dnipropetrovsk and concurrently in Luhansk, as well as continuing to increase the production of trolleybuses at Pivdenmash, soon intends to eliminate the transport problem for cities. The joint venture has decided to send the first two streetcars to Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk.

Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Valeriy Pustovoytenko, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Soviet Chairman Pavlo Lazarenko and other heads of ministries and agencies attended the presentation.

Industry, U.S. Support for Ukrainian Disarmament Explored

Shmarov Visits Ukraine-U.S. Salvage Enterprise
95UM0050A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
16 Sep 94 p 1

[News item from press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "The Recovery of Ammunition Is a Problem at the State Level"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Quite a few storage areas of missiles and ordnance have remained on the territory of Ukraine since the times when the Soviet Union existed. All sorts of ordnance have been concentrated at them for many years—from signal rockets to operational-tactical missiles. Aerial bombs, mines, shells and pyrotechnic devices had been accumulated and stored in Ukraine as a strategic reserve for the Soviet Army. Their quantities increased substantially during the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Eastern European countries. Most of these "goods" are unsuitable, or even unsafe, for use with their current physical characteristics. The performance of a whole set of operations to reduce the reserves and salvage the obsolete combat ordnance is a difficult technological problem, and will require considerable material expenditures. The Cabinet of Ministers and Ministry of Defense are devoting a great deal of attention to accomplishing this task.

The Cabinet of Ministers last year adopted the decree "The Comprehensive Recovery of Conventional Types of Ordnance Unsuitable for Further Utilization and Safekeeping." An agreement was reached with the joint American-Ukrainian enterprise Alliant-Kiev for the recovery of ammunition using Western technologies. That work is now underway.

Vice Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Defense of Ukraine Valeriy Shmarov visited one of the storage areas for the ordnance at which the firm of Alliant-Kiev is setting up technological sections. The ordnance recovery program in Ukraine is unquestionably unprofitable, and will require a great deal of funding. It is designed for the long run, with a regard for the aging of ordnance that is suitable for use today. The equipment of the firm is suited for the complete recovery of all types of ordnance in a self-contained cycle with the receipt of end products, as well as ensuring ecological cleanliness and fire and explosion safety during production.

The recovery of ordnance has to be a state matter. It affects the vital interests of our people, emphasized Valeriy Shmarov during an official council on the results of the work at the military facility. He issued an order to accelerate the installation and set-up of the equipment, so that the problem of recovery in Ukraine can be resolved more quickly. Incidentally, the United States of America, Germany and other countries are also concerned with this problem. Perhaps our experience will be of use to them in this difficult matter.

More on Ukraine-U.S. Salvage Enterprise*95UM0050B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
20 Sep 94 p 1*

[Article by Serhiy Zhurets: "The Arms Race With a Minus Sign"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting with Larry Blackdon, demilitarization director for the American firm of Alliant Techsystems, was held at the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. This firm has supported the defensive and naval systems of the Defense Department of the United States, as well as the allies of the American government, for half a century now. Alliant Techsystems has lately been involved in the reprocessing of ordnance that is not suitable for combat utilization, and is becoming a serious ecological and accident threat.

Larry Blackdon, as he indicated in our conversation, was made familiar with the activity of the joint Ukrainian-American enterprise Alliant-Kiev during his visit to Ukraine; the enterprise was created two years ago by the Ministry of Defense, the State Property Fund of Ukraine and Alliant Techsystems. This joint venture is to recover—that is, reprocess—hundreds of thousands of tonnes of the ordnance that fills the arsenals of the Ukrainian Army. The deadline for the use of that ordnance has already passed, and it is a threat to the Ukrainian public. It has been estimated that the total receipts from the sale of the reprocessed components of the ordnance will equal 100 million American dollars over the five years of operation of the joint venture. The profits will be more than 44 million dollars, half of which will be received by Ukraine. That is while the joint venture itself is self-financing.

The principal purpose of the visit by the representative of Alliant Techsystems to Kiev, however, is to propose to the Ukrainian government and its military agency a series of demilitarization projects in which the American Army has a vested interest first and foremost. Some of that work could be performed here in Ukraine, indicated Larry Blackdon. If the Ukrainian government displays an interest in it, it could count on financial support on the part of the American government.

It is true that Larry Blackdon, the director of demilitarization of the American firm of Alliant Techsystems, did not specify exactly what projects are being discussed. A delegation of Ukrainian specialists, however, is known to be planning to visit the United States soon, to become familiarized with technologies that have been developed by the American firm to destroy missile fuel. There are 130 SS-19 strategic missiles known to be stationed on the territory of Ukraine today, and each of them contains approximately a hundred tonnes of the exceedingly toxic substances in missile fuel. Alliant Techsystems is proposing to Ukraine that it reprocess the fuel into a gas that could be used for peaceful purposes, for example, for heating.

What the ultimate results of the negotiations by the representative of the American firm with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the VPK [Military-Industrial Complex] and Conversion of Ukraine will be will become clear somewhat later, however. The Alliant-Kiev joint venture, however, is already refitting a plant with a fully self-contained reprocessing cycle for conventional ordnance. Deputy Minister of Defense for the Russian Federation Andrey Kokoshin has also expressed a desire to visit that enterprise before allowing the American firm of Alliant Techsystems into the Russian demilitarization market.

Positive U.S. Assessment of Ukraine's Potential*95UM0050C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
23 Sep 94 p 1*

[Article by Volodymyr Fomenko: "High Regard for the Potential of the Ukrainian Military-Industrial Complex"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Ukraine should preserve the potential of its military industry," declared Bohdan Fedorovych, today working in Ukraine as an expert with the U.S. program of assistance for the elimination of Ukrainian nuclear weapons, in a conversation with a correspondent from Ukrinform.

The American expert is studying the capabilities of thirty enterprises of Ukraine so as to find, together with local specialists, the most efficient ways of conversion. The U.S. government is prepared to allocate funds for business conversion plans if the Ukrainian enterprise finds its own partner in the United States and creates a joint venture. The Khartron NVO [Scientific Production Association] has thus created a JV with the firm of Westinghouse, and has received five million dollars for projects to create automated control systems for technological processes.

And even though the task of Bohdan Fedorovych consists of finding ways of conversion and studying the capabilities of enterprises in the complex, he has become convinced that the changeover of these plants and associations to the output of civilian products must be pursued in a cautious manner and within certain limits. The expert is convinced that Ukraine should not squander the scientific and engineering potential of the VPK. The level of technology at defense enterprises will give them the opportunity to operate successfully in the world market. Fedorovych had a particularly high regard for Pivdenmash in Dnipropetrovsk and Khartron in Kharkiv. The expert also emphasized that every great nation should have the capability of defending itself, and of producing modern weaponry for that purpose.

SS-19 Fuel Storage at Ivano-Frankivsk Enterprise
95UM0050D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
24 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by Roman Fabryka in Ivano-Frankivsk: "On the Rails of Conversion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The collective of the Ivano-Frankivsk Boiler and Welding Plant have launched the manufacture of steel tanks for the offloading and safe storage of fuel from the SS-19 missiles.

This became possible after representatives of the Nuclear Safety Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense visited Ivano-Frankivsk. Before that they had visited a number of similar plants in Russia and Ukraine, but their choice fell on the Ivano-Frankivsk plant. Becoming familiarized in detail with the technological process for the manufacture of tanks there, the Americans had a high regard for the products, which meet all requirements and standards. A contract was signed for the output of the necessary quantity of tanks, and their delivery by the stipulated deadlines.

It must be pointed out that in accordance with this contract, which is being financed by the United States of America, Ukraine will save a considerable amount of funding from the state budget. The bank account of the boiler and welding plant, which is getting more and more solidly onto the rails of conversion, will of course also be enriched.

**Ukraine's Slowness in Acceding to
Nonproliferation Explained**

95UM0050E Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
24 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA commentator Serhiy Zhurets under the rubric "Nuclear Disarmament": "Who Is More Suited to the Role of Ostap Bender—Or, Why Ukraine Is in No Hurry To Join the NPT"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A leisurely pace in joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] as a nuclear power is now the sole trump card for Ukraine in the game with the world community, which Kiev is trying to convince that it must pay for security. Both politically and financially. And if it was unexpected that the Supreme Soviet yesterday approved joining the NPT, the situation is in no way different than that which took shape after the ratification of the START-I Treaty by Ukraine. Official Kiev, after all, has not stopped saying two things since "START" day right up to today. First, that nuclear disarmament has to give political guarantees of security to Ukraine, and second, that Ukraine should receive sufficient financial support from the countries concerned for the destruction of the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world.

These fundamentally important matters for Kiev are remaining more and more of a mirage, which provided

an opportunity for, for example, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Ukraine Valeriy Shmarov, after negotiations with Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev, to indicate that the lack of real assistance and guarantees of security for Ukraine would have an immediate impact both on the attitude of Ukrainian society toward this treaty, and on the decisions of politicians with regard to joining the NPT.

It is interesting that security guarantees for Ukraine were discussed as long ago as when Leonid Kravchuk, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin signed the trilateral declaration in Moscow. Neither Russia nor the United States rejected overall guarantees of security at that time—true, after Kiev joined the NPT. Ukraine, in taking this step, had to be satisfied first and foremost with the security mechanism that was already outlined in the non-proliferation treaty, namely the promises of the nuclear powers not to employ nuclear weapons against countries that do not possess them. But is this approach satisfactory to Ukraine? Naturally not. Especially today, when Ukraine, taking into account its announced non-alignment and neutrality, cannot ensure the upholding of its own interests—not only at the level of nuclear confrontation, but even in the protection of the integrity and inviolability of its borders. Kiev is thus trying to see that the guarantor countries expand the circle of their obligations to Ukraine considerably, by confirming the security guarantees in a multilateral treaty.

Kiev is demanding financial assistance just as pointedly as the security guarantees. The Ukrainian nuclear arms today, after all, are still held by the servicemen of the 43rd Missile Army. All of the promised foreign assistance for them has been limited to supplies of fuel and truck-mounted cranes, which are to accelerate the removal of the warheads from the SS-24 strategic missiles that displease the West so much. Ukraine today is simply not capable of doing the rest of the (much more expensive) components of nuclear disarmament—the destruction of the launch silos, the maintenance of ecological safety, the resolution of the social problems of the servicemen in the strategic forces.

As for the promised American aid, the reproaches of Kiev for delays on the part of the Americans are not unfounded. The United States, it is true, have allocated 350 million dollars to Ukraine for the program in the area of security, including for the elimination of nuclear arms and for conversion. At best 60 (for the 1992-93 fiscal years) of that 350 million have been allocated so far, however, and that to American firms, through the "filter" of which they are seeping very slowly. Ukraine is thus demanding a speed-up of the aid from the United States. Kiev, for the first time, has begun to count on the fact that Moscow supports it, since the recent visit of Andrey Kozyrev.

The political promises from Moscow, however, so far differ not at all from the financial ones from Washington. The pragmatic stalling of Kiev in joining the

NPT is entirely understandable, taking all of this into account. But the fact that the balancing act between one's "honest word" and keeping it (the approval by the parliament of Ukraine) cannot be kept up indefinitely is also no less understandable. That is at least because the validity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty itself, approved a quarter of a century ago, ends next year. An international conference to resolve the subsequent fate of that treaty will be held in April of 1995. The closer we get to April, naturally, the more palpable the political and economic pressure on Ukraine will be on the part of nations with a vested interest in the permanent extension of the NPT, with a clear delineation of countries into nuclear and non-nuclear.

Oleksandr Moroz has proposed "the adoption of a universal international document, which would encompass both the subject of this treaty and would guarantee security to Ukraine and other nations." Required for that, in the opinion of the speaker, is "the holding of an international conference in Ukraine on issues of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in January—February," to which the representatives of other nations and experts from international organizations should be invited. The conference should devise "a truly universal international agreement." If the world community does not respond to the proposal by Oleksandr Moroz, and that is highly likely, then official Kiev will have to resort to other methods. Methods aimed at seeing that the international community is persuaded of the well-foundedness of our stance—first and foremost, in the fact that the traditional NPT, with its bipolar division of the member countries into nuclear and non-nuclear, does not allow for the special status of Ukraine. Kiev has been repeating for a long time that Ukraine does not regard the nuclear inheritance on its territory as weapons (the more so as control remains in the hands of Moscow), but rather as property for which Ukraine has to receive suitable compensation. Kiev wants to be certain—even after joining the NPT—that, first, it will not lose these rights of ownership and, second, that the presence of a nuclear inheritance from the former USSR on the territory of Ukraine for seven years (before their complete elimination) will not contravene the NPT, and that Ukraine will thus not be left outside the sphere of international economic, scientific and technical cooperation in the realm of the peaceful utilization of nuclear power.

But as they say, time will tell what will come of this, and what the desire to become a non-nuclear state as quickly as possible, declared four years ago, will cost Ukraine. An unsteady equilibrium has meanwhile taken shape among all of the parties concerned. No one wants to take radical steps. It is difficult to say which of the parties is best suited to the role of the great schemer. Ostap Bender at one time did not rule out the possibility of first obtaining the chairs, and paying for them later.

Warship Design, Shipboard Armament Debate Aired

Chief Designer Discusses Weapons Systems

95UM0051A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
18 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by Serhiy Kryvko, chief designer of the Ministry of Machine Building, the VPK [Military-Industrial Complex] and Conversion for military shipbuilding, from the city of Mykolayiv under the rubric "The Building of the Armed Forces: Experience, Problem, Prospects": "To Be or Not To Be—Will There Be Production of Shipboard Armaments in Ukraine?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has already been mentioned that there are no enterprises for the production of shipboard armaments on the territory of Ukraine. The plants of St. Petersburg and the Urals have been engaged in this technically complex business since time immemorial. The complex production of large artillery systems for ships that were being built, and later for coastal artillery, appeared in Ukraine only in the 20th century. It was launched at the Black Sea Shipyard (formerly the Naval Plant, and later the Plant imeni A. Marti) and at the Novokramatorsk Heavy Machine-Building Plant. Artillery production (machine tools and tooling), however, was partially destroyed at the start of the Great Patriotic War, and part of it was evacuated to the Urals and Siberia and did not return to the territory of Ukraine. An analogous evacuation also befell the Leningrad enterprises, but they, while leaving behind well-appointed "subsidiary" series production in the Transvolga, Siberia and Central Asia (NDIs [scientific-research institutes], KBs [design bureaus], experimental production), returned to their old locations.

The situation with the production of shipboard and naval weapons is extremely grave today. Virtually 100 percent of the firing systems—the artillery, missile, anti-ship, PPO [air defense], ASW, anti-commando, decoy laying and other systems—are supplied primarily from Russia. The situation is not much better with shipboard electronics—the radio, sonar and navigational equipment. We have something to share only in the fields of structural materials and ship power engineering.

Shipbuilding in Ukraine, which built some 1/3 of the total surface vessel inventory of the navy of the former USSR, which skillfully "put together" ships in any class from the smallest patrol craft to the heaviest aircraft-carrying cruisers (or, more simply, aircraft carriers), which had significant export potential in that field, has essentially turned out to be a large and neglected assembly shop for unnecessary products. The rupture of the traditional cooperative ties was conditioned by both financial and political reasons. The economic instability and, as a consequence, the inability of the state to pay, have pushed the shipyards away from even the series-produced combat ships that they were building, and

forced a kind of "self-mothballing"; we thus still cannot discuss any prospective shipbuilding.

If we consider the statements of state figures on the maritime statehood of Ukraine as guidance for action rather than political posturing, however, then we must not forget that one of the principal components of that statehood—the Navy—cannot be created without ships in general, or without shipboard weaponry in particular.

A contemporary warship, as is well known, requires an efficient combination of artillery, missile, antiship, air-defense and ASW weaponry. That weaponry, to the extent it is technically and tactically feasible, should also be as standardized as possible with the analogous weaponry from the other branches of the armed forces—the Ground Troops, the PPO [Air-Defense] Troops and aviation.

Shipboard Artillery

A realistic appraisal of the economic, scientific and technical potential of Ukrainian enterprises, as well as an analysis of the prospects for the development of artillery weaponry (including shipboard), could lead to the conclusion that it is entirely possible to create a close-in air-defense artillery system (ZAK BR) to combat small, low-flying antiship cruise missiles (PKKR). The national development (or perhaps a copy) of a 30mm multi-barrel (gatling type) automatic artillery piece must be placed at the heart of such a system. Such a system (such as the AO-18 of Russian manufacture, or the UAI-8 produced in the United States) could also be used to equip self-propelled field PPO systems for the battalion and regimental levels, and as a pod mount for combat helicopters and attack aircraft.

A simple, single-barrel gun mount (also 30mm), standardized, for example, in an automatic gun mount, with a gun (the 2A42 or 2A72 types) from armored combat vehicles of the ground forces or combat helicopters, is also required to equip small combat vessels and auxiliary craft.

The creation of large-caliber shipboard artillery pieces (76mm, 100mm or 130mm, traditional calibers for the domestic naval forces) in Ukraine is not expedient, since the need for them will be at most in the dozens, while the expenditures required, even to copy them with subsequent mass circulation, would amount to hundreds of millions of dollars U.S. Such artillery pieces are cheaper to procure abroad (in Russia, for example), while organizing only the production of ammunition, including guided ordnance, for them here.

Antiship Missiles

These have become the primary means of waging combat operations at sea today. Antiship missiles are currently series produced by some fifty countries besides Russia.

The characteristics of the PKKR are known to determine not only the striking might of the naval forces, but

also the architectural and design look of the platforms for those missiles, which is visibly confirmed by the silhouettes of the vessels being built. There is scientific, technical and production potential in Ukraine for the creation of a national model of an all-purpose (with platforms), contemporary PKKR. Taking into account the fact that this work could be concentrated in the hands of a few, and not "spread around" among various institutions as it was in the Union, there is every expectation that what is positive from both the CIS and the distant abroad will be taken into account therein.

Proceeding from the possible time frames for the appearance of such a PKKR (not sooner than the year 2000), the specific nature of the operational zone of the Ukrainian Navy (a far-flung system of PPO) and the desire to obtain a good, scientifically sophisticated export "product," the developers of the system will have to proceed by means of creating a supersonic cruise missile with a range of not less than 200 km with a low or variable flight profile. The placement of such missiles on surface vessels or in mobile (or fixed) shore batteries would require providing for vertical launch, while their possible employment from submarines would require a reduction in the dimensions of the missile to the diameter of a torpedo tube and a "capsulized" launch. Taking into account the fact that the striking component is represented only by fighter/bomber class aircraft in the Ukrainian Air Forces (and in the air forces of other countries, if the PKKR are oriented toward exports), the PKKR should not be heavier than 1.2–1.5 tonnes.

Surface-to-Air Missiles

Proceeding from the fact that the air defense of a modern ship is structured on a combination of electronic systems and firing systems (the suppression and use of jamming) with the unfailing priority of guided surface-to-air missiles, the creation of national multiple-tube shipboard SAM systems must become "problem number one" both for the sailors and for the defense industry. The experience of the Anglo-Argentine conflict testifies that a ship in the frigate class equipped with multiple-tube SAM systems is a worthy adversary of aircraft, even when they are employed *en masse*. Such SAM systems are also no less effective in repelling attacks by PKKR.

There exists a certain potential in Ukraine for the creation of air-to-air missiles in various ranges, so the option of converting aviation missiles—that is, their adaptation for shipboard conditions and combat application—should be considered the most likely way of creating shipboard air-defense missiles.

ASW Weaponry

Even such a specific type of naval weapon such as ASW weapons (missiles, torpedoes, depth charges, mines and the like) can be standardized by platforms (shipboard and aviation, for instance). The principal focus in the area of creating ASW weapons must be placed on the reproduction (even under license) in Ukraine of one of

the types of small torpedoes (324mm) that used to be one of the main elements in the defeat of ASW missiles (created on the basis of a PKKR airframe with the replacement of the GSN [homing head] and BCh [warhead]), naval mines and an ASW torpedo system for surface ships and aviation. Large-diameter torpedoes (533 mm) to equip surface vessels and advanced submarines, which exist already, should be procured abroad.

The development of shipboard weaponry, without any doubt, will require certain expenditures by the state. But even in the early stages, as soon as confirmation of the attainability of the inherent characteristics and sufficient export capital are obtained, interested parties (that is, potential purchasers) should be notified of the work that is underway. The capital of a potential purchaser could thereby be used for the completion of the work, as well as for shared participation in further production and the sale of shipboard weaponry.

Officer Replies to Designer on Warship Selection

95UM0051B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
25 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank Serhiy Durachenko under the rubric "The Building of the Armed Forces: Experience, Problem, Prospects": "So Just What Ships Does the Ukrainian Navy Need?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The article by Serhiy Kryvko, chief designer of the Ministry of Machine Building, the VPK [Military-Industrial Complex] and Conversion for Military Shipbuilding, titled "The Fleet Needs Multipurpose Ships" that was published in NARODNA ARMIYA on 3 August 1994, elicited great interest in the Ukrainian Navy.

I agree entirely with the assertion of S. Kryvko that Ukraine needs multipurpose and general-purpose ships (frigates). The author of the article is also doubtless correct that the thrust of the features on the possible long-term paths for the development of the Navy of sovereign Ukraine depends on the level of military education of the authors, how well-informed they are and their political views.

I would only add the fact that the viewpoint also sometimes depends to a great extent on the personal and parochial interests of the author. The well-known example of the senseless competition—which turned into open confrontation—of the shipyards of Russia led to the fact that the fleet never got new and modern types of vessels. And since Serhiy Kryvko is the chief designer (as I understand it) of the Mykolayiv Shipyard, which builds large ships, one begins to doubt in passing his complete and absolute disinterestedness.

Without in any way wanting to offend the respected author, I will be so bold as to allow that he, as with most of those who design and build ships, has himself never served on those ships (pardon me if I am mistaken). It is

thus perhaps difficult, or sometimes even entirely impossible, for the honored shipbuilder to imagine how difficult it is to provide defense against small surface craft (PKO) for a task force of ships on a sea crossing. Having served on missile boats for 12 years, I cannot agree with the statement by S. Kryvko of the complete lack of a need for small missile craft [MRKs] in the Ukrainian fleet.

Ukraine does need multipurpose ships, but it needs more than those alone. However all-purpose a ship may be, it does not provide an opportunity to combine in itself to the full the qualities of assault ships, ASW ships and sweepers and the maneuverability of a "mosquito" strike fleet, the more so the qualities and combat traits of submarines. There are other minuses to a single-structure multipurpose fleet as well. Take the fact that all-purpose ships also require all-purpose specialists for their crews. And while the training of a "narrowly specialized" ship's commander, navigator and other operators of the ship's combat services takes more than a year (on the ship itself), how much time will it take for the training and "polishing" of a high-quality "generalist"? Recall that when an MRK docks in Severomorsk, the captains 3rd rank from the destroyers go there to borrow experience from the senior lieutenants on escaping a missile attack. It is not possible to pass on experience, however—it comes with the years. The preparedness of the crews of multipurpose ships is thus objectively lower than that of the crews of "narrow specialization."

A significant portion of the article by S. Kryvko was devoted to arguing that missile craft are unnecessary for Ukraine. I feel that the author's arguments were unconvincing. Without, of course, knowing strategic thinking (one flotilla to the right, two flotillas to the left), I know from my own experience that even a purely paper, theoretical model of the combat operations of the ships in the Northern Fleet of the Russian Federation shows that their 39 missile craft are a threat and, most importantly, an "irresistible" force beyond the fiords and skerries of Norway (I will not go into the details). As for the level of development of the systems for target acquisition and designation, to which my respected opponent refers is summarizing the possibility of small craft realizing their principal advantage—concealment—then I would point out that such concepts as electronic warfare (REB) exist for them as well, such as, say, direct fire suppression, decoys etc. The discovery of a small missile craft with its minimal radar signature is not all that easy (especially when close to shore). Multipurpose (medium) ships are considerably easier to find, and their ability to withstand attacks from aircraft without the appropriate fighter cover is not much better than the small missile boats. That is in theory. It is in fact significantly worse in practice.

My old division commander once joked that "Give me twenty Hawks and Storms and I'll rout all of the surface forces of the Northern Fleet [PF]." (These are, for the

uninitiated, the name of classes of missile boats of the Norwegian Navy.) He knew, and not from manuals, that with the slightest roughness of the seas at nominal ranges they (with a displacement of 120—150 tonnes) are virtually undetectable, that they cannot be hit by any missile close to shore, that the use of PKRs [antiship missiles] with conventional (non-nuclear) warheads against such small targets was not effective in general. It has proven to be virtually impossible to provide sound PKO using the forces of attack aviation alone since the last missile craft were decommissioned in the PF. How to we intend to counter the missile-boat strike groups of Turkey? And what "wise man," recalling the tragedy of the Musson or the unhappy outcome of the Libyan MRK with the Soviet P-15 missiles in the attack on the American aircraft carrier, can substantiate the lack of necessity for a "mosquito fleet" for the PF? Norway does not intend to take its RKAs out of service; they are planning to modernize and upgrade them.

I will also permit myself to remind the respected Serhiy Kryvko that most border patrol craft are built based on the design for the missile boats (205), the unsuitability of which the shipbuilder laments. I do not know how he conceives of the "defense of the continental shelf," but from the standpoint of "base alert duty" or "on anchor at patrol location," the border SKRs [missile patrol boats] at the RKA base, with a speed of over 40 knots, can perform any task in the protection of the maritime border of Ukraine.

The principal minus of these small craft is their insufficient seaworthiness. In accordance with the sailing directions of the Black Sea, however, the average annual frequency of powerful storms there is not all that great. I am not calling for being "fully self-contained" with small craft alone in any case. If you are not going out into the world's oceans beyond the bounds of the Bosphorus, then small craft autonomy for the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov is entirely sufficient. I think there is no need to talk about the cost and time frames for building a "mosquito fleet." They are significantly less than for a frigate.

And finally, why not ask the naval sailors themselves which ships they need to perform the tasks given to the Ukrainian Navy, before developing and approving a long-term shipbuilding program? Not shipbuilders and "generals from the infantry," but rather a prestigious state commission of professional naval sailors from various fields, should in any case be resolving this.

The best experts on missile craft on that commission, in my opinion, would be the commander of the western maritime region, Captain 1st Rank D. Ukrayinets (until recently the commander of the domestic MRK and RKA forces of the Northern Fleet, and commander of a group of combined strike forces of the PF) and the former senior officer of the Operations Directorate of the Black Sea Fleet, Captain 1st Rank (Reserve) V. Prystupa, who served for many years on small missile craft. The latter, by the way, answered my question thus: "The fleet needs

good and varied ships, including small missile craft. But as Ukraine cannot yet permit itself a full-fledged and multi-structured navy, I feel it is essential to give priority to the development of contemporary coastal (mobile) missile systems and systems for radar coverage and target designation." An idea, one would agree, worthy of respect. But I fear that no one is asking precisely these people. The inability of Ukraine to manage intelligently the wealth (including intellectual) that it has at its disposal is its greatest misfortune.

And one more thing. If we are talking now about the unsuitability of this or that existing (Soviet) designs for small missile craft, then the designers and shipbuilders to make them "suitable" exist as well.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Kazakhstan: Military Discipline, Desertions

954K0276A Almaty EKSPRESS-K in Russian
2, 3 Nov 94

[Article in two installments by Erik Nurshin: "I No Longer Want To Learn How To Kill"]

[2 Nov p 3]

[FBIS Translated Text] "I no longer want to learn how to kill!"—angrily exclaimed Colonel Melis Shampiyev, deputy chief of the Directorate for Indoctrination and Social-Legal Work of the Republic of Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense, at yesterday's regular session of the republic Council on the Fight Against Crime. Colonel Shampiyev then added: "Look at what is being published in the press!"—and pointed to page 16 of the newspaper EKSPRESS-K for 30 September 1994.

Five EKSPRESS-K journalists had signed their names under this antimilitary slogan.

But Colonel Shampiyev was relating the slogan to a desire to keep such general sentiment from penetrating the Armed Forces. I think the desire not to kill is a universal human rule that in no way relates to the serious disciplinary violations taking place in the ranks of defenders of the Motherland, its borders, or law and order.

It was at this session of the Council on the Fight Against Crime, chaired by State Counselor Kairbek Suleymenov, that discussion took place of the serious problem: "On the State of Military Discipline and Measures To Prevent Unauthorized Absences and Desertion in Units and Subunits of the Ministry of Defense, Border Troops, and Internal Troops of the Republic of Kazakhstan."

Executive functionaries and officials of the apparatus of the Republic of Kazakhstan president, Supreme Council, Ministry of Defense, General Procuracy, Ministry of

Internal Affairs, Republic Guard, Republic of Kazakhstan Border Troops, and the Ministry of Public Health attended this executive session and participated actively in it.

It was declared during the session that "analysis of statistical data shows that the state of military discipline is far from being in conformance with regulations..."

The crime situation in the Armed Forces is getting worse. The number of serious crimes committed has risen, and the presence of organized crime is evident. A significant spread has been seen in the practices of "hazing," the splitting of military servicemen by geographical area of origin, and degradation and abuse inflicted upon the honor and dignity of other soldiers. There has been a constant increase in the number of crimes committed—both military-related and general crimes. Numbers of instances of drunkenness, unauthorized fraternization, and other violations of military discipline are on the rise.

Over the first nine months of this year, 2,776 crimes in the Armed Forces were reported. This represents an increase of 20.7 percent over the same period of last year. A significant percentage of this activity is related to unauthorized absences from the unit—also on the rise. In 1993, 1,448 cases of unauthorized absence were reported. This year 1,969 have already been reported...

The growth of crime and other legal violations among border and internal troops—previously distinguished by a high level of military discipline—has elicited serious alarm. The volume of crime in border troops increased from 109 instances last year to 289 this year. Of this number, 219 are related to unauthorized absences from the unit (there were 69 such crimes in 1993). The crimes were committed by three officers, two warrant officers, 12 sergeants, and 199 soldiers. Some 35 servicemen in the border troops were convicted of crimes this year (there were 24 in 1993).

In the internal troops, 451 crimes were committed (308 in 1993), including 324 cases of unauthorized absence. Today, 531 military servicemen are under investigation. In addition, 51 crimes of a general nature were committed in the internal troops, including 38 incidents of theft of state or private property. These crimes were committed by 29 officers, nine warrant officers, 43 sergeants, and 372 soldiers.

This situation has come about primarily due to the extremely inadequate level of work organization in the indoctrination and training of servicemen in their basic term of service, unsatisfactory selection of officer cadre conducting the indoctrination...

A personnel shortage exists with respect to officers who conduct the indoctrination process—this category is 52-58 percent under strength. However, certain officers working in these positions do not constitute a good example for soldiers and sergeants. They themselves

violate military discipline and leave their place of duty without authorization. For example, Lieutenant T. Yergaliyev, deputy company commander for social-legal work in Unit 13231, left his unit without authorization, for which he was sentenced to three years confinement on 19 March of this year. Captain I. Tokhtakhunov, deputy unit commander for indoctrination in Unit 5654, was also sentenced to three years confinement for unauthorized absence from his unit.

As before, poor everyday living conditions for officers, warrant officers, and soldiers in basic term of service continue to exert a negative influence on the incidence of unauthorized absences. Extremely unsatisfactory preparation for military service under winter conditions has been seen over the past two or three years at military posts. Interruptions in food supply, issue of uniforms, and supply of medicines and essential everyday items have become normal occurrences, especially in remote garrisons.

Lack of preparedness of the military post of Unit 11567 (Chemolgan) for winter operations, lack of cold water, heating malfunctions, violations of sanitation and hygiene norms, and the indifference shown by commanders to grievances and statements submitted by young soldiers concerning the absence of proper living conditions led to a situation in which 32 servicemen banded together and left the unit, returning to their place of residence...

Military commissariats are confronting serious problems... They have organized the operation of medical commissions in such an extremely unsatisfactory manner that not only have youth with a variety of illnesses been entering the ranks of the Armed Forces, but mentally disturbed young people as well. In 1993, 3,565 individuals were discharged from the Armed Forces for health reasons, including 3,419 declared unfit for service in peacetime. Some 146 individuals were removed from the rolls entirely. In addition, 555 individuals with illnesses of the central nervous system were discharged from the Armed Forces in 1993 alone. The recruitment of mentally ill citizens presents a particularly serious danger. For example, Private V. Uksukpayev, of Unit 03142, murdered fellow servicemen V. Bazhenov and caused grave bodily injury to Private N. Kaliyev. But, according to the determination of a judicial-psychiatric board of review, V. Uksukpayev was suffering from a congenital psychic illness in the form of feeble-mindedness. The extent to which he was affected by psychic disorder was such that he was declared not responsible for his actions, and the criminal case against him was closed with the adoption of medical treatment measures. (Declaration of the Turkestanskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, South Kazakhstan Oblast). A great many such examples can be cited. The greatest number of illegally recruited servicemen was noted in Almaty Oblast—64 individuals. The number of such cases in Pavlodar Oblast was 42, Karaganda Oblast—36, South Kazakhstan—30, Zhambyl and Kostanay Oblasts—30...

As many people properly point out, all these problems are related to the catastrophically low degree to which servicemen are supplied with material provisions. In some military units, soldiers do not see meat or butter for weeks. Only 5 percent of Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel have been provided with overcoats. Many military garrisons have been forced to procure food through agreements with agricultural enterprises. Is this a job for the military? "You would be amazed at what services—besides the GAI [State Automobile Inspectorate]—are out on the roads trying to get extra food!"—a responsible Ministry of Internal Affairs official stated frankly during the session.

Many measures for improving the situation were proposed as results of the discussion were generalized. These include establishment of a faculty to train military indoctrination personnel, reestablishment of the basic military training that was prohibited by law in the schools, institution of a new ideological concept to replace the communist one, organization of the military police...

But despite all such noble intentions, the material aspect of things exists all the same, of course. Where can you find all the money required, when soldiers and officers do not have shoes, clothing, and food?! Perhaps the idea expressed in the auditorium just before the session ended

rings true: "If we cannot maintain such an Armed Forces, then we must reduce it!"

[3 Nov pp 1, 3]

[FBIS Translated Text] *At the latest session of the republic Council on the Fight Against Crime, Supreme Council Deputy Tatyana Silkina handed certain frightening documents over to our correspondent, with exclusive right of publication in EKSPRESS-K.*

Document No. 1

Deputy Minister of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan—Chief of the Directorate for Indoctrination and Social-Legal Work

...To the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Social and Legal Matters, T. SILKINA.

House of Parliament, Almaty

Outgoing No. 25/454, 6 October 1994

Incoming No. 4348, 11 October 1994

In response to your deputy inquiry, I send you herewith information on the number of military servicemen killed in the Army of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1992-1994 (we publish here only a portion of the information contained in this detailed document, for a great deal still remains unclear—E.N.):

	1992	1993	1994 (as of 1 Oct)
Total deaths	126	151	84
Including:			
Officers	25	19	16
Warrant officers	13	14	10
Soldiers, sergeants	88	118	58
As the result of medical assistance rendered too late	2 (1.5 percent)	3 (1.9 percent)	3 (3.6 percent)
Number of total deaths due to suicide	29 (23 percent)	50 (33.1 percent)	27 (32.1 percent)

Commentary of T. SILKINA, chairman of the Subcommittee on Social and Legal Matters of the Committee for National Security and Defense of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan (exclusively for EKSPRESS-K):

I received the following response from the Ministry of Defense to my original deputy inquiry on the number of deaths of servicemen in the Army of the Republic of Kazakhstan (not including Internal and Border Troops, the Republic Guard, special mission forces, etc.—E.N.):

"The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan does not have any information regarding annual losses of military servicemen—citizens of Kazakhstan in the postwar years up through and including today." We received this response 26 August of this year. This unique document was signed by a deputy minister of defense. I cannot give his name because he is "under the

gun." I made another inquiry, and this time received a response! So here is what we have. Despite reduced numbers of servicemen from 1992 to 1994, a relatively greater number of them have perished. Further provided was a breakout of the incidents of death and reasons behind them. I immediately presented these data to Yuriy Khitrin, military procurator of the republic at the General Procuracy, and asked him for a complete explanation, since a great deal is unclear.

But what astonished me more than anything else was this tremendous number of suicides. It turns out we have a mother sending her son to the Army so that he can end his life there! We do not have anyone studying the reasons for the suicides. We have no military science. Our officers have not mastered all the educative techniques, methods of studying human personality, interpersonal and group-relations research methods that

would be necessary. Suicide is a very complex phenomenon, and there exist many scientific methodologies for averting suicide in the Army—a closed male collective requiring special treatment. But what is happening in our young Army is horrible!

These figures will appear in print for the first time. I therefore give your newspaper the exclusive right to publish them, insofar as I love and respect EKSPRESS-K. Our society must know everything. The demands society makes of the Army should increase, because the Army is maintained through taxpayer money. Consequently, we must have full control over it. Upon receipt of this frightening document, my actions were as follows: most important—a commitment to publish it; to verify, jointly with the military procuracy, what was done in

each instance of death with respect to criminal case handling; to introduce this problem for discussion in the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Council Committee for National Security and Defense; and at some time in the future, to present the matter for examination during a plenary session of the parliament.

Document No. 2

To the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan...

Listing of Persons Declared Unfit for Service with the VDV (Airborne Forces)—E.N.) by the medical commission of Unit 32363

1.	Z.	Temirtau City Military Commissariat	Enlargement of the thyroid gland
2.	R.	Stepnogorsk City Military Commissariat	Enuresis. Varicocele I-II degree. Chronic tonsillitis
3.	B.	Saraszaki Rayon Military Commissariat, Zhambyl Oblast	Exterior hemorrhoids
4.	A.	Alfarabyskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, South Kazakhstan Oblast	Myopia, mild
5.	D.	Auezovskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, City of Almaty	Chronic pyelonephritis. Emotional-volitional instability
6.	V.	Stepnogorsk City Military Commissariat, Akmola Oblast	Neuro-circulatory dystonia of hypertonic variety. Emotional-volitional instability
7.	K.	Abayskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, City of Shymkent	Enuresis. Chronic gastroenteritis
8.	K.	Zharminskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, Semipalatinsk Oblast	Varicocele II degree
9.	D.	Bibekshinskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, South Kazakhstan Oblast	Weight loss
10.	T.	Akmola City Military Commissariat	Deformation of the nasal septum. Rhinopathy
11.	N.	Zaysanskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, City of Zaysan	Chronic decompensated tonsillitis
12.	G.	Ulbinskiy Rayon Military Commissariat VKO [expansion unknown]	Chronic decompensated tonsillitis. Flat feet I-II degree
13.	A.	Semipalatinsk City Military Commissariat	Neuro-circulatory dystonia, mixed variety. Emotional-volitional instability
14.	A.	Abayskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, Semipalatinsk Oblast	Chronic gastritis. Cardiac NKD [expansion unknown]. Emotional-volitional instability
15.	M.	Semipalatinsk City Military Commissariat	Weight loss. Acne. Streptoderma of the lower extremities
16.	M.	Lagovskoy Rayon Military Commissariat, Zhambyl Oblast	Varicocele II degree
17.	M.	Temirtau City Military Commissariat	Chronic nephritis
18.	I.	Kalininskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, City of Almaty	Chronic pyelonephritis
19.	M.	Shakhtinsk City Military Commissariat	Neuro-circulatory dystonia, of the cardiac variety. Emotional-volitional instability
20.	B.	Dzerzhinskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, South Kazakhstan Oblast	Chronic bronchitis. Situation following acute pneumonia complicated by exudative pleurisy
21.	A.	Kokpektimskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, Semipalatinsk Oblast	Chronic bronchitis. Chronic tonsillitis. Weight loss
22.	K.	Glubokovskiy Rayon Military Commissariat VKO [expansion unknown]	Neuro-circulatory dystonia, mixed variety
23.	Ye.	Talaskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, Zhambyl Oblast	Flat feet I-II degree. Rheumatic polyarthritis
24.	Sh.	Talgarskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, Almaty Oblast	Chronic pyelonephritis
25.	N.	Mansulakskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, Semipalatinsk Oblast	Chronic decompensated tonsillitis

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Deputy Commander of Unit 32363

Chief of the Department for Indoctrination and Social-Legal Work

Lieutenant Colonel D. Abramov

(The actual document states the full names of the military servicemen involved).

Commentary of Tatyana SILKINA (exclusively for EKSPRESS-K):

I note right away that this military listing was selected by the military commissariats for airborne forces! In one unit alone we see the names of 25 young men declared unfit for airborne duty. This phenomenon is universal to our Army, where military commissariats allow many recruits to remain in civilian life in exchange for bribes. While they shove into the ranks all those who cannot buy their way out. Take note of the fact that you have on this list five individuals diagnosed with "emotional-volitional instability"! In other words, we still do not know how they would have handled the weapon entrusted to them. And to this day the Ministry of Defense has not punished a single military commissar, not a single military commissariat!

FROM THE AUTHOR

So the words of Kairbek Suleymenov, state counselor and chairman of the Council on the Fight Against Crime, ring true: "Our military commissariats are rooted in corruption!"

And I agree with him. What is our Army teaching?

INTERREGIONAL ISSUES

CIS Military Integration Prospects

954F0297A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by Dmitriy Trenin under the rubric "Opinion": "Collective Security and Collective Defense: The Military Integration Plans of the CIS Countries Are Becoming More Realistic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Within the framework of the revitalized debate concerning the reintegration of the post-Soviet states, a notable place is occupied by questions of convergence in the military-political and military spheres. Things have not been confined to debate: It may be affirmed that for the first time in three years the trend toward the drawing together of the defense space is starting to be the prevailing trend. A minimum of three most important circumstances are contributing to this: an awareness by the political elites of many new independent states (NIS) of the enormous difficulties that attend the independent building of national defense systems and, consequently, the gravitation toward a military alliance with Russia; the gradual formation in Russia itself of the political will in support

of the military-political union of the countries of the CIS as a means of stabilization of the situation on the periphery of the Russian Federation and the creation of a "good-neighbor zone" around Russia; finally, as a derivative of the first two, the far greater realism in the vision of the actual ways and forms of realization of military integration plans.

The purpose of the present Russian defense policy in the near abroad is, evidently, the restoration—on a new basis and on a different scale—of the unity of the military-strategic space of the former Union (minus the Baltic) that was torn apart or seriously undermined as a result of the disintegration of the USSR. Designed to achieve this purpose is a strategy whose main components are the creation of a military-political alliance of the CIS headed by Russia; the close coordination of the efforts of the Russian Federation and the NIS in the guarding, and if necessary, the defense, of the external borders of the Commonwealth; the restoration of military-economic relations within the former Union military-industrial complex; the conversion of the CIS into a regional organization that is recognized by the world community as bearing (with Russia having the lead role) the main responsibility for the settlement of armed conflicts on the territory of the post-Soviet states. It is thus obvious that the former approach based on the theory of collective security and the practice of the division of the once united Soviet Army is giving way to a new approach aimed at realization of the principle of collective defense and the creation under the aegis of Russia of joint, and in the future, united, armed forces of the CIS.

It might at first glance seem that those that in the fall and winter of 1991-1992 were defeated in the argument over the fate of the Soviet military legacy have been compensated by history: The course of events has confirmed that they were right and, on the other hand, set an inordinately high price for the success of the recent "nationalizers" of the army. Nonetheless, it has to be seen that irreversible changes, which rule out a direct return to primary unification ideas, have occurred in the past three years in all the former Soviet republics.

We need first and foremost to scrutinize the concept of a common Eurasian strategic space as the cornerstone of the majority of integration constructs. The unity of this space is seen as natural and stabilizing, and its rupture, as, correspondingly, unnatural and destabilizing. The weakening of Russia's positions in the world, the conflicts in the post-Soviet states, the expansionist aspirations of certain contiguous countries—these are the main arguments adduced in support of this proposition. The conclusion: Unite before it is too late, sounds logical.

What is the basis of this unification? The imperial interests of a vast multinational state served as this basis in past times. Today there is no such state, and it will hardly emerge tomorrow. It has to be a question of a community of security interests of a number of independent states, a number of which are located in East

Europe, others, in the Transcaucasus, and yet others, in Central Asia. How great can this community be?

There are two instances wherein it could be sufficient for the formation of a military-political alliance. The first, traditional instance: a perception of the community of opposing threat. It was such a perception that formerly united Norway and Italy, Portugal and Turkey around the United States and beneath the flag of NATO. The second instance is a natural consequence of multilateral integration, when it is essential that the building of a federative structure entail the "federalization" of defense. This process is occurring currently within the framework of the European Union. How do matters stand in the CIS in this connection?

For the majority of NIS a common external threat (and its perception) is absent. The attention of Armenia is concentrated on Azerbaijan and Turkey, and of Uzbekistan, on Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and Belarus is, possibly, free of the perception of any threat at all. The blank resistance of the CIS countries to Russia's repeated attempts to enlist them in joint peacekeeping operations in conflict zones on the territory of the former USSR testifies to the degree of real, not sham, community of perceived threats.

As far as broad reintegration, the result of which could be a unified defense system, is concerned, all attempts at "reunification" have thus far proven unsuccessful mainly owing to the fact that they have conceptually been addressed to the past and have been based on material and ideological structures whose positions have been incessantly eroded. In this sense there should be even fewer hopes for a Eurasian union than for the CIS.

A process of the formation of a number of regions is actually occurring in the place of the "subworld of the USSR": a new East Europe, Transcaucasus, and Central Asia. The differences in the geostrategic position of the NIS and their security requirements, threat levels, and so forth are extraordinarily great and are continuing to increase. They are, of course, drawn together by one circumstance: All three new regions are situated on the periphery of Russia, which has its interests in each of them. But even in this case the relations among the new East Europeans, Caucasians, and Central Asians are indirect. Thus the unity of the strategic space—in the sense of a buffer separating it from the traditional abroad—really exists only for Russia and is a fiction for the NIS.

Consequently, it cannot be expected—even less demanded—of Belarus that it will perceive the situation in Gornyy Badakhshan as directly affecting the fundamental interests of its security or that Uzbekistan will display concern for a strengthening of Russia's Far East borders. On the other hand, there is an undoubted community in the interests of Russia and a number of states in each of the newly formed regions. Under these conditions, what is more beneficial from the viewpoint

of the interests of Russia—relying on an illusory community of interests of all the former republics and heaping onto itself the burden of the building and upkeep of a new Warsaw Pact, whose history could prove shorter than, and its fate, similar to the fate, of the prototype? Or seeking less all-embracing, but more efficient, longer-lasting, and cheaper options? This, it would seem, is an important question, the answer to which will help impart the optimum parameters to the planned military-political integration.

The author sees the following version of an answer. Instead of a single, but predominantly formal military-political alliance within the framework of the entire CIS, Russia could adopt a policy of the building of a system of regional agreements for deterring and warding off possible power challenges to itself and its new neighbors. In each region here Moscow would rely on the countries whose long-term security interests are so consonant with our regional interests that no change of leaders or governments could rapidly alter the national strategic priorities.

Obviously, in East Europe this means Belarus, which covers a most important strategic axis, secures our ground lines of communication with the rest of Europe, and brings Russia as close as possible to its Kaliningrad enclave. A union with Georgia, which is interested, like Russia, in preventing the regional expansion of neighboring states, is natural in the Transcaucasus. In Central Asia our strategic ally on the southern and eastern axes is Kazakhstan.

Close Russian-Belarusian relations in the military sphere ensuing from the organic convergence of the two countries could be developed on the basis of a bilateral security treaty, which would not cause apprehension among neighbors: Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic. The corresponding supreme political and military authorities would be formed and joint armed forces would be created within the framework of regional treaties on the collective defense of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Even though the allies of the new Russia would not be that many, they would be key, supporting states bound to Russia by strong ties. Russia could accord its allies dependable security guarantees.

The separation from the ranks of CIS countries of a group of allies poses the question of Russia's relations with the other, "non-allied" states. Would Russia not thereby repel them and hurl them into neighbors' embraces? Would regional balances not thus be upset to Russia's detriment?

If we are speaking of East Europe, then, despite the good prospects of economic integration and certain coincidental security interests of Russia and Ukraine, their military alliance is hardly possible politically as a consequence of the manifest domination therein of Russia. In addition, an alliance concluded despite the manifest absence of a military threat in East Europe could itself give rise to the apprehensions of neighboring Central

European states and provoke a process whose result might be the reconstitution of the enemy image. Under such conditions Russian-Ukrainian cooperation in the defense sphere could include the basing in Crimea on the corresponding terms of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the integration of air defense and ABM systems, the coordination of border activity, and, of course, the military-technical cooperation of the two countries.

In the new situation the strategic significance of Moldova for Russia is peripheral. A military threat to our country from this direction is absent. In addition, Moldova is split, and under these conditions a military alliance between Moscow and Chisinau could be of significance only to Tiraspol. For its part, despite the economic attachment to the countries of the CIS, Chisinau is firmly attuned toward a neutrality that excludes a foreign military presence. Russia's interest consists of promoting a settlement of the conflict between the Left Bank region and the rest of Moldova, not of acquiring bases "with a view of the Balkans."

There can hardly be any expectation of an alliance with Azerbaijan with the intention of deterring potential challenges on the part of Turkey and Iran (and where else?). Account should be taken also of the steadfast anti-Russian mood of part of the Azerbaijani political elite. Cooperation with Baku could include military-technical and border issues and lease of the radar station. Armenia, on the other hand, is definitely oriented toward an alliance with Russia, for which this country also is of obvious strategic interest. Nonetheless, despite the presence of Russian bases and border guards and also Moscow's assistance in the formation of Armenia's armed forces, an official military alliance with Yerevan—prior to the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, in any event—could be detrimental to Russia's positions in Azerbaijan and in the region as a whole.

Finally, in Central Asia the military-political line that Russia is actually in a position to hold runs, probably,

along the southern and eastern borders of Kazakhstan, which should be our strategic ally. The other countries are either extraordinarily unstable or are pursuing goals barely consonant with ours or demonstratively prefer neutrality. In addition, as experience shows, threats emanating from the Central Asia-Middle East region may be countered least with the aid of traditional bloc building. Bilateral and multilateral military cooperation in specific areas (air defense, borders, military-technical cooperation) could produce greater benefits.

So a system of Russia's collective defense alliances would include a security treaty with Belarus, a defense treaty with Georgia and a special agreement with Armenia, and a defense treaty with Kazakhstan. Affiliated to this system would be a package of agreements with Ukraine and agreements on border protection, the unification of air defense systems, the leasing of facilities, and military-technical cooperation with other countries of the CIS.

Contrary to the widespread notion, collective security is not a lower form of military-political integration compared with collective defense. In actual fact, these two constructs differ in principle. Whereas the first is designed to ensure security against encroachments emanating from within some community ("collective") of states, the second is aimed at repulsing threats directed from outside. Collective defense could, of course, also imply the collective security of the allies in respect to one another, but this aspect is undoubtedly subordinate. Finally, "security" does not require indication of the potential aggressor since all would obtain equal guarantees against one another but "defense" could not be built without a sufficiently certain vision of a probable enemy. In practice this means that it would be expedient, together with the creation of regional defense systems, to preserve the system of security of the CIS, which could be entrusted with the mission of practical peacekeeping on the territory of the Commonwealth.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY & CONVERSION

Defense Sector Survival Demands New Resources, Plans

954K0230A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 43, 26 Oct 94 p 10

[Article by German Lomanov: "Why Is Russia Being Squeezed Out of the Arms Market?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The arms business is an extremely profitable one. Almost 200 countries of the world purchase weapons systems, while only five are seriously involved in developing and producing them. However, we can hardly be expected to remain within the five if continue to thoughtlessly conduct the process of conversion.

We Have No Gunpowder

Do you recall the epithets the years of five-year plans acquired? "Determinant," "deciding," and the like? So now we have the government of reforms declaring this year "the year of breakthrough into the arms market." Lots of luck!

Yes, we did sell Malaysia 18 MiGs (true, it is unclear whether or not we can cook potatoes in the palm oil they are providing us as partial payment, according to terms of the contract). Yes, Kuwait signed an agreement for the purchase of BMPs and Smerch missile systems. And last year Iran purchased a submarine, 10 SU-24s, and 150 BMPs. It seems China intends to acquire a large consignment of SU-27s, another series of ground-to-air missiles, and licensing for production of the MiG-31. But perhaps it is still too early to be sounding the trumpets in joyous fanfare....

A report of the research service of the United States Congress emphasizes that Russia somewhat intensified its activity on the arms market last year, increasing sales from \$1.6 to \$1.8 billion (our statistics use the amount 2 billion—perhaps to round off the figures?). It is a reassuring figure—for those who do not know that we have reduced our export production volume as compared with 1986.

But the percentage of American firms on the world arms market grew from 55.8 to 72.6 percent in just one year. The United States has strengthened its position, while Russia is losing ground.

In logic there is the law of sufficient basis. Its essence is usually illustrated using one simple example. Gathering his vassals around him, the French king became terribly upset when he failed to be greeted in one of his castles with a gun salute. To the question as to what was going on, the commandant replied:

—Sire, there are over 30 valid reasons why.

—Name them.

—First of all, there is no gunpowder....

—Enough—the king interrupted.

We could have a great discussion on the disagreements between Rosvooruzheniye and the directive body of the military-industrial complex, which desires to trade its production output without intermediaries. We could discourse at length about lack of knowledge of the laws of marketing, the lack of sharp business sense. All that is so. But there is one chief reason for our departure from the world arms market.

We have no gunpowder.

Collapse of the once powerful "nine," the defense ministries, is turning the government's hopes to earn a worthy place for Russia in the arms market into illusions. And when I hear optimistic statements concerning "the year of breakthrough," I automatically think back to the story of my good friend, Vladimir Vishnevskiy. He founded a joint-stock company, Ametekh, that produces micro-breweries. These are all serviced by one individual. The technological process is controlled by computer. These breweries cost the client far less than similar ones in America, and they are in no way inferior in quality. In short, Vishnevskiy demonstrated that a Soviet engineer is entirely capable of becoming a successful businessman in the post-Soviet economy. And he would have become the hero of a success story, were it not for one thing...

In the past, Vladimir Vishnevskiy was the developer of a unique weapon. There is nothing like the Smelchak and Centimeter artillery systems, developed under his direction, being used in the world today. The problem-solving capability inherent in these systems is such that a gun can operate according to the "fire and forget" principle. You can forget because you know that the very first round will hit its target.

When the Smelchak and Centimeter were declassified, military circles of a number of countries expressed interest in them and the government allowed them to be exported, insofar as it was quite clear that those systems that could be sold without damage to our army would bring the country hundreds of millions of dollars. But when has it been true in Russia that the right hand knows what the left hand is doing? Series production of these systems came to a complete halt. Only with difficulty was Vishnevskiy able to hold on to his circle of developers—the talented weapons experts got involved in building breweries.

In any normal self-respecting country, design personnel of that quality are held in reverence. But it would seem that the engineering elite is absolutely unnecessary to our economy. Vishnevskiy's fate is entirely typical. But at least he moved into business. While the high-class specialist from the Dimitrovgrad Nuclear Reactor Institute has gone into sanitary engineering. You have to stop and think—could it really be true that our country does not need intellectual potential?

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From Crumbling Conversion to Collapse of the Sectors

Few people know that during Yegor Gaydar's first move to power, the government seriously examined the "zero variant" of conversion. The meaning behind this elegant expression is simple—do not give one budget ruble to "defense." One can only suppose that the authors of this concept rejected this patently absurd variant only out of fear of major social upheaval. Nonetheless, in 1992, military requisitions were reduced by approximately 70 percent. The consequences of such a crumbling "conversion" continue to this day to have Russia's military-industrial complex in a fever.

Without any doubt, we saw "hypertrophy" of the military-industrial complex (according to expert assessments, it "ate up" one-fourth of the gross national product). However, world practice shows that it is difficult even for the most economically powerful countries to cope with a conversion rate of 5-10 percent. Higher rates lead to the degradation of entire sectors of industry. Which is what has happened in Russia.

In the first year of "reform-type conversion," success was achieved in creating additional civilian production output capacities in only 274 of 634 plants. Why? Because just a little over half of the special-purpose credits reached the enterprises. This situation repeated itself last year.

As a result, enterprises were forced to hand over state budget appropriations received at the end of the year, almost in their entirety (99.9 percent), to commercial banks, in order to make loan and interest payments on their debts. Understandably they have not been taking out these loans for the fun of it—the promised state support never comes, and you have to operate, you have to buy materials and components, you have to pay people wages.

Declaring its support for conversion, the government has in fact been financing not the military-industrial complex, but rather commercial banks. In the opinion of experts of the State Committee for the Defense Industry, monetary funds are being pumped from the state budget into the banking system, while the military-industrial complex is working not to meet the needs of defense or the economy, but to enrich the banks.

Viktor Glukhikh, chairman of the State Committee for the Defense Industry, cites seemingly rosy figures: Today only one-fifth of the production output of enterprises of the military-industrial complex is military related. The remainder is civilian production. But his position requires that he be optimistic—he has to report on the results of conversion. Anyone can understand that a comparison of tank production to coffee-grinder production can only be made in terms of price. But the state establishes prices for tanks, while the market dictates the coffee-grinder price. Therefore, no serious expert would risk relying on Viktor Glukhikh's figures in evaluating structural changes in the military-industrial complex.

These changes are taking place not so much due to the growth of peacetime production output as to sharp reductions in the production of military equipment. On the other hand, administrative structures are undergoing restructuring at a frantic pace. Initially, the powerful "nine" defense ministries, converted into modest departments, were placed under jurisdiction of the unregulated super-ministry of industry, which was eliminated shortly after being created. The remaining "eight" were then united in the Russian Federation State Committee for the Defense Industry, its control functions once again being curtailed. There was a recent rumor that they were intending to transform the committee into a department of the Ministry of Economics. Permanent reorganization of the apparatus is a wildly fascinating idea, but a disturbing one to officials, and it could never substitute for the real diversification of defense industries. But this is proceeding sluggishly.

A Programmed Lag

Foreign firms are gladly taking advantage of the powerful science and technology potential our Motherland is demanding for the military-industrial complex. For example, the Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute completed in the ex-USSR practically all its theoretical studies and statistical research for aircraft engineering. Today the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense is not listed among clients of the institute, which include, however, the Boeing Company, French, German, Indian, Japanese, South Korean, and British firms that are currently providing one-third of the research and experimental design program of what is the largest aircraft scientific research institute. A great many similar examples can be cited.

But the problem is that our military-industrial complex, in trying to survive, is beginning to work for someone else. The problem is that it does not want to work for our own Armed Forces. Difficult financial circumstances are forcing many plants to the verge of shutdown. They are unable to obtain money from the Ministry of Defense for production output already delivered. And it is unlikely they will obtain it—Viktor Chernomyrdin stated in a recent speech that there is no money, and there will be none. If some money were to appear, it would be very little.

Is it surprising that by hook or by crook enterprises are trying to avoid defense requisitions? The low utilization of equipment (10-15 percent) and the need to maintain so-called mobilization (in the event of war) capacities make the production of arms expensive and unprofitable. A real danger has arisen that not only might we lose research-intensive, promising technologies, but we may sharply degrade the country's defensive capacities as well. With such a decline, how promising can hopes of ensuring conversion of the defense industry through arms sales be?

To this—I repeat—purely rhetorical question, several others, no less serious, could be added. This year and the

year before last, military outlays and arms production were sharply reduced. Where did the money go? Which depressed sectors of industry did we succeed in enhancing by virtue of the money saved? Why do our structures of authority consider conversion not a state mission, but rather a private endeavor of the military-industrial complex itself? Why is there no concept as yet of the structural-technological integration of the defense industry into the civilian economy? Why is the federal conversion program, even the present one compiled from different industries into one, kept on hunger rations?

In just two years we have managed to reduce eightfold the index of expenditures for research and design work in the "defense industry." We still have the Tors and MiGs we inherited from the ex-USSR, but we have already programmed a future technological retardation into our Armed Forces and the defense industry.

A new air-cushion assault-landing ship, the Bison, was recently commissioned in St. Petersburg. The vessel is capable of speeds up to 70 knots, on land or water, and can negotiate an obstacle of up to three meters in height. The Bison's hauling capacity is 250 tonnes, one-fourth greater than American air-cushion vessels. Commenting on the appearance of this unique ship, one highly placed Pentagon official noted: "It would be cheaper to give the Russians \$10 billion for them to change the production profile of a few enterprises than to try to keep up with them here."

Quite frankly stated.

Commentary from the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Economics Section

Problems associated with Russia's military-industrial complex arise constantly when the fate of economic reform is being discussed. And these problems have either ripened or overripened to the point that many experts have lost all hope of emerging from the crisis in an "amicable" way. Virtually all these sore spots are pointed out in G. Lomanov's article, along with the methods that could be used to "treat" them. Prescription No. 1 would be to begin real reform. For it is easy to say—"We do not need Howitzers" and draw the line there. This is not reform—it is profanity. There are 5,000 military production plants in Russia, where approximately 15 million engineers and workers are employed. In total, about 55 million individuals work in the military-industrial complex. Even without looking to ethical considerations—which, it would seem, are not operational inside the Garden Ring, but being guided only by elementary common sense, one can understand that it is better to have this social grouping as a friend than as an enemy. Unfortunately, economic policy has been conducted proceeding from political considerations up until very recently. Political considerations that were, incidentally, deeply erroneous—using economic methods to shift Russia's managers to as low a position as possible on the social ladder.

All of this does not sweep aside the objective fact that our super-militarized economy is in need of true conversion. And if our oil generals do not voluntarily share the oil rents with the defense industry in order to "rearm" production, then the military-industrial complex will acquire it by force—which it presently has in abundance.

These same considerations can also be addressed by our authorities, who do not allow our manufacturers to produce for export, blocking to this day the establishment of financial-industrial groups.

The destiny of our reforms and, without exaggeration, of Russia as a whole depends on how adequately and promptly the problems of Russia's military-industrial complex will be resolved (in the context of economic reforms).

Satellite Launching Complex Fails To Yield Dividends

95UM0072A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Nov 94 p 5

[Article by Aleksandr Dolinin: "'Start' in the Market—a Serious Competitor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Here's an amazing thing. A country recognized as the world leader in space and rocket technology is unable to break into the space technology market. We aren't talking about superprofitable deals—about heavy Proton rockets, or about launching communication satellites into geostationary orbit. Even a program like "Start" has unfortunately reached a dead end in the international aspect, and is not yielding the anticipated dividends. Why?*

This newspaper has written about the project before. The "Start" program came into being due to life itself, due to the desire to decrease the drain of highly skilled specialists and to preserve the sector's capability for producing modern equipment both for the army and for the national economy under the conditions of shrinking budget financing of military rocket building.

Developers of the well known Pioneer (SS-20) and Topol (SS-25) rocket systems from the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering sought the simplest, most natural way out of the difficult position. They proposed modifying military rockets that had finished serving their purpose in the forces (particularly in the Strategic Rocket Forces) into launch vehicles for small satellites.

"Moreover, all of this is to be done on a commercial basis," said Lev Solomonov, the institute's deputy general designer, "in such a way that the budget wouldn't be involved at all."

For your reference: The Topol (RS-12M) military rocket, with an added fourth stage and other technical improvements carried out in strict compliance with Russia's

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international obligations, because what is now called the Start-1, and its five-stage counterpart is known simply as the Start.

These launch vehicles can do an excellent job of inserting small satellites into near-Earth orbit. For example Start-1 can deliver around 300 kilograms of payload and a maximum of over half a ton into a circular orbit at an altitude of up to 700 kilometers. The rocket uses solid propellant as its energy source. This guarantees safe operation, and does not require complex fueling equipment.

But the main thing is something else. The Start launch system is not complex in its operation, it is highly reliable, it is transportable, and it allows launching from pads requiring the least engineer preparation in any location—in Africa, Asia, the East....

When on 25 March of last year a demonstration launch of the Start-1 was conducted at the rocket proving ground in Mirnyy, specialists, diplomats and businessmen from the United States, Norway, Sweden, Colombia and other countries were not just casual guests. A satellite that was designed by the Thermal Engineering Institute with the participation of the Elas Scientific-Production Association and which was created in the shortest time ever was successfully launched together with data transmission apparatus by means of a Start-1, to the general delight of onlookers, and by the way, it is still functioning.

Special mention should be made of the fact that this celebration would not have occurred, had it not been for the I.V.K. Joint-Stock Company, which invested resources into this project. It cost the state almost nothing.

And so, the first Start went into orbit. And then what happened? Lev Solomonov tells the story:

"After that, there was a pleasant time of euphoria. Numerous proposals began coming in from foreign clients. In particular the first contact was with a firm from South Africa. But as we know, events there turned the country's interests away from space.

"Still, this first success was there—a kind of recognition by clients of launching services, and a realization by sellers of these services, like us, that we were serious competition to them. However, although it seemed that it should have ended in our favor, competitive bidding announced by satellite owners did not end victoriously for us. It was as if the results were manipulated by a strong, expert hand.

"In short, the 'wolves' were waiting for us, ready to devour anyone attempting to claim a piece of the action, especially newcomers. Even now they are licking their chops over us in rapt anticipation of their feast, while their politicians tell us into a sense of security with talk of free competition, of ending discrimination against Russia, and of aid.... Like fingers on the same hand, all state administrative structures are helping, openly and under cover, to

crowd us out of the market. In this way they are protecting their corporations from competitors. Such is the state policy that has apparently received the highest approval, particularly in the United States."

Does this mean, then, that all of this, the dead end and the entry into the world market, had been special-ordered for us? It is believed in the Thermal Engineering Institute that success could be achieved if effective support were forthcoming from the state. There is much that our interested departments can do here. It would be important to adopt standards securing at least the levels of tax, customs and other fees that are commonly accepted in the world, if not advantageous ones. All of our "vertical" and "horizontal" authorities should realize that if the effort were successful, at least part of the resources expended earlier to create this highly expensive weaponry could be returned to the Russian treasury.

"Isn't this idealistic?, you might ask," said Lev Solomonov. "It depends on how you look at it. We believe, after all, that diligence, intelligence, persistence and faith in success will put Start rockets into orbit. And they will go into space as often as needed by customers. We have many rockets. And they are good rockets. We are not letting up, we are working further to improve Start rockets. In parallel with our principal line of work. For the time being, this is still possible. Also reassuring is the fact that our Start rockets are feared in the international market. It is understood there that they are a serious competitor."

Tula Machine-Building Plant's Conversion Successes Detailed

954F0172A ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian
25 Oct 94 p 3

[Article by Nikolay Kireyev: "Guns for the Market, Pools for Themselves.... Tula Weapons Makers Have Found Their Own Recipe for Survival"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tula—This all happens with the Tula machine builders because they do not depend on the state's pockets.

The Tulamashzavod Company has not only changed names in its 55-year history (machine-tool building plant, P.O. Box 96, Ryabikov Machine-Building Plant) but also its products list. It has manufactured Maksim machine guns, antitank weapons, mortars, aircraft machine guns, weapons for armored equipment and naval vessels, metal-cutting machines, hosiery, spinning, and twisting frames, petroleum, and coal industry equipment.... Nearly 40 years ago the enterprise began producing motor scooters. You can see them on the roads to this day—the Turist, the Tulitsa, the Muravey, recently joined by motorcycles like the Tula and the Vepr, and also three-wheeled motorcycles.

The plant's oldest worker, General Director Vadim Usov, thinks that they have realized in time that it is

suicide to rely solely on the state's pocket and subsidies, so they have geared their survival program to a flow of funds from the sale of products, expanding their assortment to meet people's demands and ability to pay, and entering the world market. Low-priced items you can find there include motorcycle equipment, spare parts, and the Tarpan cultivator using the tried-and-true motor scooter engine.

Right now, the plant is turning out about 40,000 motor scooters a year. The marketing office estimates that the demand for them in Russia and the CIS countries alone is more than 200,000. But if the enterprise had relied on the domestic market alone, it would have gone down the tubes long ago. The largest share of profits comes from exports. It is the tried-and-true Muravey that is pulling the load: It is sold in almost 20 countries; its load-carrying model is especially popular in Latin America, and it is making inroads in Europe and the Orient. Only 20 to 30 percent of all exported items are sold abroad fully assembled; the rest are put together in place, in the countries of purchase. This makes it possible to save shipping costs and taxes.

For example, several Muravey assembly lines have been set up in Argentina; Tulamashzavod specialists are on hand there. Exports not only bring in hard currency but also foster improved quality, reliability, and design. Without this, the foreign market could simply be lost. For example, the Japanese want to compete with the Tula people in Latin America's motor scooter market. To avoid being left out, the Tula people are working intensively to improve the export model of Muravey—increasing its carrying capacity, installing electronic ignition, improving its lacquer finish, cooperating with other enterprises to develop a new, more powerful, economical, and ecologically clean diesel-gasoline engine.

Still, the plant is known chiefly as a major producer of military equipment, which used to bring it renown. Now the output of defense products has dropped to 20 percent, but on the other hand the output of civilian and consumer goods has been raised to almost 80 percent.

The general director shares his secret: "We did this by using dual technologies. Let's say we are producing guns for infantry combat vehicles and rapid-fire antiaircraft weapons, which, because of their huge workload, require toughness, reliability, and precision. Now these weaponry plants have started manufacturing mine drills, coal combines, and submersible pumps for oil workers. The experience gained in manufacturing military equipment makes it possible to use our technologies in medicine. For example, the Kvazar laser perforator for clinical analysis of blood without damaging the skin prevents various infections, including AIDS.

"These days, all many manufacturers can talk about is the chaotic market, the collapse of the economy, and disintegration of the social sphere. Our company pays special attention to people. We are building our own housing and allocating it free of charge; our machine

builders were placed in a hundred apartments in both 1992 and 1993, and by the end of this year an equal number will receive apartments. In the near future, our own brick plant will turn out its first batch. We have 12 kindergartens, eight swimming pools, and one of the city's best medical centers. This year, the Sukhodol children's recreation camp opened its own medical facility. The Khoroshovka tourist center is being enlarged. We have a Palace of Culture, and we sponsor schools, a lyceum, a technicum, and a branch of the technical university. The best students receive stipends honoring famous Tulas such as Demidov, Degtyarev, and Sadykin. Our farming operation produces goods for plant cafeterias, which enables us to provide low-cost lunches, milk, meat, and butter.

SECURITY SERVICES

Criticism of 'Putina-94' Anti-poaching Exercise in Far East

954Q0070A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian

No 41, 1 Nov 94 [signed to press 25 Oct 94] p 7

[Article by Sergei Saktaganov: "Japanese Poachers Return Home Successfully With the Permission of Russian Border Guards and the Office of the Public Prosecutor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Southern Sakhalin—The last issue of the newspaper discussed the course of the "Putina-94" operation. Despite the undoubted usefulness of this operation, we have not experienced complete satisfaction and legal pride in the operation's completion. The final stage of the operation, which was implemented in the Far East, cannot be called victorious in any way. In concluding our discussion of the "Putina-94" theme, we present materials gathered by our own correspondent.

The final stage of the "Putina-94" operation, which was begun on the seas of the Far East in order to avoid the brazen plunder of Russian maritime resources by foreign poachers, was concluded with embarrassment. However, its "heroes" were not Japanese or Chinese fishermen, but our own keepers of the border and guardians of the law. Vladimir Kashpruk, chairman of the Kuril Region Committee for Environmental and Natural Conservation, has accused the administrations of local border guard organs and the office of the public prosecutor of malfeasance in office, related to losses of Russian maritime resources valued at almost \$6 million.

What is almost a detective story begins on 29 June, when about 6.5 miles from the shores of Iturup Island workers from the maritime inspectorate of the oblast natural conservation committee discovered two Japanese schooners catching various types of fish in Russian territorial waters. We do not know how this meeting would have turned out for the crews of Khayato Maru 51 and Khiron Maru 8 if a regular coast guard vessel had been there instead of the maritime inspectorate's vessel. This time

the poachers were out of luck. The workers of the local inspectorate sail a Japanese schooner that was confiscated from similar violators and for this reason they are able to move at equal speed and to detain the poachers with ease.

Furthermore, things progressed in the stipulated manner for such cases. The inspectors forced the Japanese to raise the decks that had been brought forward for the fish catch, and drew up protocols. Registered to the Hokkaido city of Rausu, the schooners were escorted to a filtration point in Krabozavodsk, the fishing equipment was confiscated, and the fish that was found aboard was handed over for processing to the local Ostrovnoy combine. Nothing unexpected foreshadowed the investigation that was to come, especially since the Japanese themselves immediately confessed to the violation of fishing rules. Kabayasi Masato, captain of Khayato Maru 51, who resided in the city of Rausu, also added the following to the protocol in his own handwriting: "I was engaged in catching fish in territorial waters. I knew that I was violating Russian laws, and apologize."

All that was left was to draw up the papers and submit them to the court in order to exact damages, previously established by the maritime inspectorate at \$5,848,750 from the poachers. Since the company that owned the transgressing vessels could not pay this amount, both schooners with all of their equipment were to be confiscated in lieu of payment. It should be noted that in this course of events there was nothing unusual in the behavior of the legal organs. In the waters of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands today not only inspectors but also local fishermen, and when necessary, passengers, sail on schooners that are confiscated from poachers and then resold. As a rule, these schooners are equipped with the most modern navigation and industrial equipment, have powerful engines, and are reliable in bad weather.

But this time a happy acquisition for Russian rubles of samples of Japanese machine building did not take place. Here is what Vladimir Kashpruk told our ROSSIYA reporter by radio-telephone from Iturup Island:

"Almost half a month after the capture of the poachers, V. Chumachenko, the public prosecutor for the Southern Kurils, refused to bring criminal action due to the absence of adequate evidence. It would seem that literally all of the evidence is available, from the schooners themselves and the confiscated catch to the captain's handwritten admission! I immediately contacted the reception of the commander of the Pacific Ocean Border District, and faxed all of the existing documents there. I

received assurance that the commander would order the detention of the schooners. This time the local border detachment exhibited enviable efficiency. While my conversations were taking place, and without waiting for documents from the office of the public prosecutor, but solely as a result of the telephone call, it assessed the situation and released both schooners to go home. Moreover, the schooners were not traveling light—the Japanese even took along that fishing equipment that we had essentially already confiscated from them! Since the breach of confidence, negligence, and even the obvious agreement among individuals in authority was self-evident, I immediately sent the oblast and interrayon natural conservation offices of the public prosecutor a statement with a request to immediately deal with this scandalous case."

The protectors of Russian maritime treasures waited in vain for help. They received the most mediocre formal reply from the Sakhalin interrayon natural conservation office of the public prosecutor—the materials had been given over to the oblast office of the public prosecutor. A month later the latter sent a response to Iturup Island in which it even reproached the inspectors for recording the violation on the wrong form and in an incorrect manner, thus rendering the documents invalid! As for measures to influence guilty subordinates, the deputy oblast public prosecutor, Viktor Todorov, informed the luckless fighters against poachers that the shortcomings tolerated by the individual fulfilling the role of the regional public prosecutor would be "examined by the latter!"

In general, it is hard to believe that the workers in our office of the public prosecutor remind us in even some small way of that noncommissioned officer's widow who flogged herself. Based on what has taken place, we can only draw the same conclusion that Vladimir Kashpruk came to—that at least on the oblast level the scandal was fairly successfully "suppressed."

However, the "troublemaker" of Iturup Island is not satisfied with this. As reported to our reporter by the chairman of the rayon natural conservation committee, not only does he intend to appeal to the General Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Russian Federation and to the commander of Russian Border Guards, he also plans to prosecute the Southern Kuril Office of the Public Prosecutor and local border guard organs for damages. Damages, let me remind you, that comprise the sum of \$5,848,750. If Vladimir Kashpruk wins his case in court, a rather remarkable page will appear in the history of Russian border guards and legal organs, informing us about how they paid for the tricks of Japanese poachers in the territorial waters of their own country.

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